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Abstract
Three decades ago, Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani (STOC 1990) defined the online matching
problem and gave an optimal 1− 1e ≈ 0.632-competitive algorithm. Fifteen years later, Mehta,
Saberi, Vazirani, and Vazirani (FOCS 2005) introduced the first generalization called AdWords
driven by online advertising and obtained the optimal 1− 1e competitive ratio in the special case
of small bids. It has been open ever since whether there is an algorithm for general bids better
than the 0.5-competitive greedy algorithm. This paper presents a 0.5016-competitive algorithm
for AdWords, answering this open question on the positive end. The algorithm builds on several
ingredients, including a combination of the online primal dual framework and the configuration
linear program of matching problems recently explored by Huang and Zhang (STOC 2020), a
novel formulation of AdWords which we call the panorama view, and a generalization of the
online correlated selection by Fahrbach, Huang, Tao, and Zadimorghaddam (FOCS 2020) which
we call the panoramic online correlated selection.
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1 Introduction
Consider an ad platform in online advertising, e.g., a search engine in the case of sponsored search.
Each advertiser on the platform provides its bids for a set of keywords, for which it likes its ad to
be shown. It further has a budget which upper bounds its payment in a day. When a user submits
a request, often referred to as an impression, the platform sees the bids of the advertisers for it.
The platform then selects an advertiser, who pays either its bid or its remaining budget, whichever
is smaller. The goal of the platform is to allocate impressions to advertisers to maximize the total
payment of the advertisers. The revenues of online advertising in the US have surpassed those of
television advertising in 2016 [5], and have totaled $57.9 billions in the first half of 2019 [6].
While online advertising acquires growing importance in practice, it has also been extensively
studied in theoretical computer science. The first related research dates back to three decades ago,
when Karp et al. [29] introduced the online matching problem and designed an online algorithm
with the optimal 1 − 1e ≈ 0.632 competitive ratio. It can be viewed as the special case with unit
bids and unit budgets. Fifteen years later, Mehta et al. [35] formally formulated it as the AdWords
problem. They introduced an optimal 1− 1e -competitive algorithm under the small-bid assumption:
an advertiser’s bid for any impression is much smaller than its budget.
Subsequently, AdWords has been studied under stochastic assumptions. Goel and Mehta [16]
showed that assuming a random arrival order of the impressions and small bids, a 1− 1e competitive
ratio can be achieved using the greedy algorithm: allocate each impression to the advertiser who
would make the largest payment. Mirrokni et al. [37] analyzed the algorithm of Mehta et al. [35]
in the more restricted unknown iid model, and obtained an improved ratio of 0.76 for small bids.
Finally, Devanur et al. [8] proved that the greedy algorithm is 1− 1e -competitive for general bids in
the unknown iid model. For small bids, they proposed a (1 − )-competitive algorithm. We refer
readers to the survey by Mehta [33] for further references.
Little is known, however, about the most general case of AdWords, i.e., with general bids and
without stochastic assumptions. On the positive end, we only have the greedy algorithm and the
trivial 0.5 competitive ratio. On the negative end, there is no provable evidence that the optimal
1− 1e competitive ratio of online matching cannot be achieved in AdWords. It has been open since
Mehta et al. [35] whether there is an online algorithm that achieves a competitive ratio strictly
better than 0.5.
1.1 Our Contributions and Techniques
The main result of the paper is the first online algorithm for AdWords that breaks the 0.5 barrier.
Theorem 1. There is a 0.5016-competitive algorithm for AdWords.
We develop the algorithm under the online primal dual framework. In a nutshell, by considering
an appropriate linear program (LP) of the problem, the online primal dual framework designs the
online algorithm according to the optimality conditions of LPs, and uses the objective of the dual
LP as the benchmark in the analysis. Buchbinder et al. [4] applied it to AdWords with small
bids, using the standard matching LP, to obtain an alternative analysis of the 1 − 1e competitive
algorithm by Mehta et al. [35]. Later, Devanur and Jain [7] and Devanur et al. [9] found further
applications of the framework in other online matching problems. Recently, Huang and Zhang [20]
demonstrated an advantage of using the configuration LP instead of the standard matching LP
in online matching with stochastic rewards. The current paper also builds on the strength of the
configuration LP, echoing the message of Huang and Zhang [20]. See Section 2 for details.
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Our second ingredient is a novel formulation of AdWords which we call the panorama view.
Recall that an advertiser’s payment in the original formulation is either the sum of its bids for the
assigned impressions or its budget, whichever is smaller. The panorama view further associates
each advertiser with an interval whose length equals the budget, and requires the algorithms to
assign each impression to not only an advertiser, but further a subset of its interval with size equal
to the bid. For example, consider an impression i and an advertiser a whose budget is 2 and whose
bid for i is 1. The panorama view associates advertiser a with an interval [0, 2). Further, when
an algorithm assigns i to a, it must further assign i to a subset of size at most 1, e.g., [0.5, 1.5).
Define an advertiser’s payment in the panorama view to be the size of the union of the assigned
subsets, which lower bounds the payment in the original formulation. The panorama view allows
a fine-grained characterization on how the assignment of an impression i to an advertiser a affects
the marginal gains of the other impressions assigned to a. Concretely, suppose we shortlist two
advertisers for each impression, and then assign it to one of them with a fresh random bit. In the
original formulation, having advertiser a in impression i’s shortlist decreases the marginal gain of
all other impressions that shortlist a in a complicated manner. In the panorama view, however, it
decreases the marginal gain only for those whose assigned subsets intersect with i’s; more precisely,
it decreases the contribution of the intersection by half. See Section 3 for a formal definition of the
panorama view and some examples.
Finally, instead of using a fresh random bit to select a shortlisted advertiser for each impres-
sion, our algorithm selects one with negative correlation. If a previous impression which shortlists
advertiser a with an overlapping subset does not select a, the current one will be more likely to
select a. Given the same shortlists, negatively correlated selections get larger expected gains in
the panorama view than independent selections. An algorithmic ingredient called online correlated
selection (OCS) by Huang and Tao [18, 19] provides a quantitative control of such negative correla-
tion in the special case when bids equal budgets. The final piece of our algorithm is a generalization
of OCS which applies to the general case of AdWords in the panorama view. We refer to it as the
panoramic OCS (PanOCS). Section 2 includes a formal definition of OCS, Section 4.1 defines the
PanOCS and sketches the main ideas behind it, and Section 5 provides the details.
Building on these ingredients, we get a 0.50005-competitive online primal dual algorithm for
AdWords in Section 4, weaker than the ratio in Theorem 1 yet breaking the 0.5 barrier nonetheless.
To obtain the final ratio, we observe that the above algorithm works better for larger bids while
the algorithm of Mehta et al. [35] is better for smaller bids. Hence, we design a 0.5016-competitive
hybrid algorithm in Section 6 by unifying both approaches under the online primal dual framework.
Appendix A analyzes the algorithm of Mehta et al. [35] for small bids using online primal dual and
configuration LP, which may serve as a warmup for readers unfamiliar with the framework.
1.2 Other Related Works
AdWords is closely related to the literature of online matching started by Karp et al. [29]. Aggarwal
et al. [1] studied the vertex-weighted problem and obtained the optimal 1 − 1e competitive ratio
with a generalization of the algorithm by Karp et al. [29]. Feldman et al. [13] investigated edge-
weighted online matching in the free-disposal model, where the algorithm may dispose a previous
matched edge for free to make room for a new one. They called it the display ads problem, and
achieved the optimal 1− 1e competitive ratio assuming large capacities, i.e., each offline vertex can
be matched to a large number of online vertices. The analysis was simplified by Devanur et al. [10]
under the online primal dual framework. Further, Fehrbach et al. [11, 12, 18, 19] obtained a better
than 0.5-competitive edge-weighted algorithm without assuming large capacities. In doing so, they
introduced the OCS which directly inspired this paper. Finally, there are generalized models which
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allow all vertices to be online and even consider general graphs [3, 15, 21, 23, 24, 25, 38].
Online matching problems are also widely investigated under different stochastic assumptions.
First, consider random arrivals of online vertices. Karande et al. [28] and Mahdian and Yan [31]
showed that the algorithm of Karp et al. [29] is strictly better than 1− 1e -competitive in this model.
Huang et al. [22] gave a better than 1− 1e -competitive algorithm for the vertex-weighted problem.
Kesselheim et al. [30] showed that the greedy algorithm is 1e -competitive for the edge-weighted
problem even without free-disposal. Under the stronger assumption that online vertices are drawn
iid from an unknown distribution, Kapralov et al. [27] proved that greedy is 1− 1e -competitive for
a more general problem called online submodular welfare maximization which captures both the
edge-weighted problem with free-disposal and AdWords as special cases. Further assuming that
the distribution is known leads to better competitive ratios [14, 17, 26, 32]. We leave for future
research if the algorithm in this paper is better than 1− 1e -competitive under random arrivals.
Finally, Mehta and Panigrahi [34] proposed online matching with stochastic rewards, where an
edge chosen by the algorithm is successfully matched only with some probability. They focused on
the special case of equal success probabilities and gave algorithms that are 0.567-competitive if the
success probability is vanishing, and better than 0.5-competitive in general. Later, Mehta et al. [36]
showed a 0.534-competitive algorithm for vanishing unequal success probabilities. Recently, Huang
and Zhang [20] improved the competitive ratios to 0.576 and 0.572 for vanishing equal and unequal
success probabilities respectively. In doing so, they showed an advantage of the configuration LP
over the standard matching LP under online primal dual. This paper echoes the above message.
2 Preliminaries
Consider a bipartite graph G = (A, I,E), where A and I are sets of vertices corresponding to the
advertisers and impressions in AdWords respectively, and E ⊆ A × I is the set of edges between
them. Further, each edge (a, i) is associated with a non-negative real number bai which represents
advertiser a’s bid for impression i.1 By allowing zero bids, we may assume without loss of generality
(wlog) that G is a complete bipartite graph, i.e., E = A× I. Finally, each advertiser a is associated
with a positive budget Ba which upper bounds the payment of the advertiser. Concretely, assigning
a subset of impressions S ⊆ I to an advertiser a leads to a budget-additive payment:
ba(S)
def
= min
{∑
i∈S
bai, Ba
}
.
By this definition, we may assume wlog that bai ≤ Ba for any advertiser a and any impression i.
The advertisers are given upfront, while the impressions arrive one at a time. We write i < i′ if
an impression i arrives before another impression i′. On the arrival of an impression, the algorithm
must immediately and irrevocably assign it to an advertiser. The objective is to maximize the sum
of the above payments from all advertisers. Following the standard competitive analysis of online
algorithms, an algorithm is Γ-competitive for some competitive ratio 0 ≤ Γ ≤ 1 if its expected
objective is at least Γ times the offline optimal in hindsight for any AdWords instance.
Configuration Linear Program. The algorithms in this paper and their analyses rely on the
LP relaxations of the problem. Instead of the standard matching LP, this paper considers the more
expressive advertiser-side configuration LP and its dual:
1AdWords as an online algorithm problem does not consider the strategic behaviors of the advertisers. We merely
inherit the term bid from the original paper of Mehta et al. [35].
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max
∑
a∈A
∑
S⊆I
ba(S)xaS
s.t.
∑
S⊆I
xaS ≤ 1 ∀a ∈ A∑
a∈A
∑
S3i
xaS ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ I
xaS ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A,∀S ⊆ I
min
∑
a∈A
αa +
∑
i∈I
βi
s.t. αa +
∑
i∈S
βi ≥ ba(S) ∀a ∈ A,∀S ⊆ I
αa ≥ 0 ∀a ∈ A
βi ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I
Let P and D denote the objectives of the primal and dual LPs respectively. Throughout the
paper we will always let xaS be the probability that S is the subset of impressions assigned to
advertiser a. Then, the primal objective P equals the objective of the algorithm.
Online Primal Dual Framework. We build on the online primal dual framework which uses
the dual objective as an upper bound of the offline optimal in the competitive analyses of online
algorithms. In particular, this paper applies it to the configuration LP of AdWords.
Lemma 2. Suppose an online algorithm is coupled with a dual algorithm which maintains a dual
assignment such that for some 0 ≤ Γ ≤ 1:
1. Approximate dual feasibility: αa +
∑
i∈S βi ≥ Γ · ba(S) for any a ∈ A and any S ⊆ I.
2. Reverse weak duality: P ≥ D;
Then, it is Γ-competitive.
Proof. By the first condition, scaling the dual assignment by a factor of Γ−1 makes it feasible while
changing the dual objective by the same factor. Therefore, by weak duality of LPs, the offline
optimal is at most Γ−1D. Putting together with the second condition proves the lemma.
Online Correlated Selection. The algorithms in this paper further utilize a recent algorithmic
ingredient called online correlated selection (OCS) by Huang and Tao [18, 19]. Consider a set of
ground elements, and further a sequence of pairs of these elements arriving one at a time. Suppose
we randomly select one element from each pair with a fresh random bit. Then, an element will
be selected at least once with probability 1 − 2−k after appearing in k pairs. The OCS correlates
the randomness to achieve better efficiency. We state below a simplified definition, removing some
aspects irrelevant to AdWords.
Definition 1. For any 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, a γ-OCS is an online algorithm ensuring that for any element
which appears in k pairs, it is selected at least once with probability at least:
1− 2−k(1− γ)max{k−1,0} .
3 Panorama View
The algorithms in this paper are based on a novel viewpoint of the AdWords problem which we
call the panorama view. Recall that the payment of an advertiser a is budget-additive in AdWords:
assigning a subset of impressions S to an advertiser a gives ba(S) = min
{∑
i∈S bai, Ba
}
. Let µ(·)
4
denote the Lebesgue measure. In the panorama view, we further associate each advertiser a with an
interval [0, Ba); each impression i assigned to a is further assigned to a subset Yai ⊆ [0, Ba) whose
Lebesgue measure µ(Yai) is at most bai. In fact, we will always choose Yai to be a finite union of
disjoint left-closed, right-open intervals, for which the Lebesgue measure is simply the sum of their
lengths. Further define the payment of an advertiser a in the panorama view as:
µ
( ∪i∈S Yai) .
Correspondingly, the objective in the panorama view is the sum of the above payment from all
advertisers. Importantly, it lower bounds the original objective of AdWords.
Lemma 3. For any advertiser a, any subset of impressions S assigned to a, and any subsets
Yai ⊆ [0, Ba) with Lebesgue measure at most bai for impressions i ∈ S, we have:
µ
( ∪i∈S Yai) ≤ min{∑
i∈S
bai, Ba
}
.
Proof. On the one hand, by subadditivity of the Lebesgue measure function µ, and by the measure
upper bounds of the subsets Yai’s, we have µ
( ∪i∈S Yai) ≤∑i∈S µ(Yai) ≤∑i∈S bai. On the other
hand, because Yai’s are subsets of [0, Ba), we have µ
( ∪i∈S Yai) ≤ µ([0, Ba)) = Ba.
Example 1 (Deterministic Algorithms). Consider an arbitrary deterministic algorithm. Then,
whenever it assigns an impression i to an advertiser a, we may wlog further assign it to the leftmost
unassigned interval. For instance, suppose impressions 1, 2, 3, and so on are assigned to advertiser
a in this order; we may further assign 1 to [0, ba1), 2 to [ba1, ba1+ba2), 3 to [ba1+ba2, ba1+ba2+ba3),
and so forth. In doing so, the objectives in the panorama view is identical to the original one.
Oblivious Semi-randomized Algorithms. The panorama view of AdWords separates itself
from the original one when it comes to a special family of randomized algorithms which we call the
oblivious semi-randomized algorithms. They are semi-randomized in that for every impressions i,
they either assign it deterministically to an advertiser-subset combination, or choose two advertiser-
subset combinations and assign it to one of them with equal marginal probability. We shall refer
to the former as a deterministic round and the latter as a randomized round. If an impression i
corresponds to a randomized round, we say that it is semi-assigned to the advertiser-subset com-
binations. For the time being, readers may think of using a fresh random bit in every randomized
round for a concrete understanding of the panorama view, although our algorithms will correlate
the decisions in different rounds negatively.
Further, these algorithms are oblivious: neither the decisions of deterministic versus randomized
rounds, nor the choices of advertiser-subset combinations depend on the realization of random bits
in previous rounds. Hence, the semi-assignments to the same advertiser may have overlapping
subsets and thus, the objective in the panorama view no longer equals the original one in general.
Example 2 (Oblivious Semi-randomized Algorithms). Let there be two advertisers whose
budgets equal 2, and three impressions for which both advertisers bid 1. Further suppose that we
select with a fresh random bit for each impression. In the original budget-additive payments, with
probability 14 all impressions are assigned to the same advertiser and thus the objective equals 2;
otherwise, the objective equals 3. Hence, the expected objective equals 14 · 2 + 34 · 3 = 114 . In the
panorama view, however, the algorithm must further assign each impression to a subset of [0, 2) for
both advertisers. It is wlog to assign the first impression to [0, 1), contributing 1 to the objective.
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Further, it is reasonable to further assign the second impression to [1, 2) so that it is disjoint with
the first one and contributes 1 to the objective. However, the third impression only contributes
1
2 to the objective regardless of the choices of subsets because the entire interval [0, 2) has been
semi-assigned once. Therefore, the expected objective is only 1 + 1 + 12 =
5
2 .
It may seem odd to restrict ourselves to oblivious algorithms. Would it not be better if we first
check the realized assignments in earlier rounds and then pick an advertiser-subset combination
disjoint with the previous ones? In a nutshell, we focus on oblivious algorithms to separate the
algorithmic component for choosing assignments and semi-assignments, and that for correlating the
decisions in different randomized rounds. Importantly, we can achieve negative correlation: a semi-
assignment is more likely to get selected if an earlier overlapping one is not. By contrast, screening
the options based on the realization of earlier random bits could lead to positive correlations (e.g.,
weighted sampling without replacements [2]). That said, there may be AdWords algorithms with
controlled positive correlations which are better than 0.5-competitive. The study of such algorithms,
however, is beyond the scope of this paper and is left for future research.
Bookkeeping at the Point-level. It is more convenient to account for the primal objective at
the point-level as follows. We say that a point y ∈ [0, Ba) of an advertiser a is assigned if there is
an impression i assigned to a and a subset Yai containing y, either due to a deterministic round, or
due to a semi-assignment in a randomized round which selected a. For randomized algorithms, let
0 ≤ xa(y) ≤ 1 denote the probability that y is assigned. Then, the primal objective equals:
P =
∑
a∈A
∫ Ba
0
xa(y)dy . (1)
Similarly, we say that y is semi-assigned whenever an impression is semi-assigned to a and a
subset containing y. Let ka(y) denote the number of times that y is semi-assigned. Further define
ka(y) =∞ if y has been assigned in a deterministic round, driven by the fact that semi-assignments
on their own take finitely many rounds to make a point y assigned with certainty.
We further introduce point-level dual variables αa(y), a ∈ A, y ∈ [0, Ba), and let:
αa =
∫ Ba
0
αa(y)dy . (2)
Then, approximate dual feasibility becomes:∫ Ba
0
αa(y)dy +
∑
i∈S
βi ≥ Γ · ba(S) (3)
Panoramic Interval-level Assignments. We first introduce some notations which are useful
throughout the paper. For any point y ∈ [0, Ba), any subset Y ⊆ [0, Ba), and any 0 ≤ b ≤ Ba,
let y ⊕Y b denote the point in [0, Ba) such that the interval [y, y ⊕Y b) excluding Y has Lebesgue
measure b. Here, we abuse notation and allow y⊕Y b to be smaller than y, in which case [y, y⊕Y b)
denotes the union of [y,Ba) and [0, y ⊕Y b). In the boundary case when the subset [0, Ba) \ Y has
a measure strictly less than b, i.e., Ba − µ(Y ) < b, define y ⊕Y b = y. Further define the reverse
operation y 	Y b such that [y 	Y b, y) \ Y has measure b.
For any advertiser a and the set of impressions assigned and semi-assigned to it, the algorithm
will further select subsets of [0, Ba) greedily as follows. Maintain a point y
∗ initially at 0 which
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𝑘!"#$𝑘!"#$ + 1
∞
0 𝐵!
(a) Interval-level assignments
𝑘!"#$𝑘!"#$ + 1
∞
0 𝐵!
(b) Update in a deterministic round
𝑘!"#$𝑘!"#$ + 1
∞
0 𝐵!
𝑘!"#$ + 2
(c) Update in a randomized round
Figure 1: Illustrative example of interval-level assignment represented by ka(y)
represents the start of the next subset. For each impression i, further assign or semi-assign it to
[y∗, y∗⊕YDbai)\YD, where YD is the subset of [0, Ba) that has already been assigned deterministically.
Further update y∗ = y∗⊕YD bai. To this end, think of [0, Ba) as a circle by gluing its endpoints; the
algorithm scans along the circle to find a subset with measure bai that has not been deterministically
assigned. It is similar to taking a panorama and hence the name of the alternative view of AdWords.
The panoramic interval-level assignments equalize the numbers of times the points y ∈ [0, Ba)
are semi-assigned, among those that have not been deterministically assigned. We omit the proof
since it follows by the definition of the algorithm. See Figure 1 for an illustrative example.
Lemma 4. For any a ∈ A and any y ∈ [0, Ba), ka(y) equals either (1) kmin = minz∈[0,Ba) ka(z), or
(2) kmin +1, or (3) ∞. Further, the first kind satisfies y ≥ y∗, and the second kind satisfies y < y∗.
4 Basic Algorithm
This section presents an oblivious semi-randomized algorithm that is better than 0.5-competitive for
AdWords. Section 4.1 presents a brief introduction to an algorithmic ingredient called panoramic
online correlated selection (PanOCS), which correlates the randomized decisions in different rounds
negatively. Section 4.2 then demonstrates an online algorithm powered by PanOCS, and Section 4.3
analyzes it under the online primal dual framework. Finally, Section 4.4 optimizes the parameters
of the algorithm to achieve a 0.5041 competitive ratio in the crux of AdWords, i.e., when all nonzero
bids are large, 12Ba ≤ bai ≤ Ba, and a smaller 0.50005 competitive ratio in the general case. The
latter is smaller than the ratio in the main theorem but breaks the 0.5 barrier nonetheless.
Formal descriptions of the PanOCS algorithms and their analyses may be of independent interest
and are therefore deferred to a separate Section 5. The 0.5016 ratio in the main theorem requires
a hybrid approach which treats large and small bids differently, which we present in Section 6.
4.1 Panoramic Online Correlated Selection at a Glimpse
Recall the oblivious semi-randomized algorithms. In each randomized round, such an algorithm
chooses a pair of advertiser-subset combinations, oblivious to the random bits in previous rounds.
Then, the combinations are passed on to an algorithmic component which selects one of them with
equal marginal probability, and correlates across different randomized rounds negatively. We call
it the PanOCS since it is a generalization of the OCS [18, 19] in the panorama view of AdWords.
For a formal definition, recall that xa(y) is the probability a point y ∈ [0, Ba) of an advertiser
a has been assigned, and ka(y) is the number of randomized rounds in which y is semi-assigned.
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Definition 2. A PanOCS is an online algorithm which takes a sequence of pairs of advertiser-
subset combinations as input, and for each pair selects one combination. It is a γ-PanOCS for
some 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 if for any advertiser a, and any point y ∈ [0, Ba), we have:
xa(y) ≥ 1− 2−ka(y)(1− γ)max{ka(y)−1,0} . (4)
Observe that using an independent random bit in every randomized round is a 0-PanOCS,
since the probability of being assigned after k semi-assignments with independent random bits is
precisely 1− 2−k. The parameter γ quantifies the advantage over independent random bits.
The intuition behind the inequality is best explained with a thought experiment. Suppose that
whenever y is semi-assigned other than the first time, there is a γ chance to be perfectly negatively
correlated with the last semi-assignment of y: a is chosen this time if it is not chosen last time,
and vice versa. Further suppose that the above events are negatively dependent for the ka(y) − 1
different pairs of adjacent semi-assignments of y. Then, y is never assigned only if none of the
events happens, whose probability is at most (1 − γ)ka(y)−1, and further when none of the ka(y)
independent selections picks a, which equals 2−ka(y). Our analysis will substantiate this intuition.
To see the connection with OCS, consider a special case when the bids equal the budgets, i.e.,
bai = Ba. Then, since xa(y) and ka(y) are independent of y, it suffices to consider if advertiser a
has been assigned. As a result, the above definition coincides with the definition of OCS, taking
the advertisers as the ground elements. The extra challenge of PanOCS is to ensure the inequality
simultaneously for all points y ∈ [0, Ba) when the bids are arbitrary.
Theorem 5. Suppose all nonzero bids are large, i.e., 12Ba ≤ bai ≤ Ba or bai = 0 for any advertiser
a ∈ A and any impression i ∈ I. Then, there is a 0.05144-PanOCS.
Theorem 6. Suppose the algorithm makes at most kmax semi-assignments to any point y ∈ [0, Ba)
of any advertiser a ∈ A. Then, there is a 0.01245 · k−1max-PanOCS.
The proofs of the theorems are deferred to a separate Section 5. We include below a proof sketch
of a weaker 164 -PanOCS for large bids to foreshadow the arguments in our PanOCS analyses.
Proof Sketch of a Weaker Theorem 5 (γ = 164). For any impression i semi-assigned to an advertiser
a, we write (i+j)a to denote the j-th impression semi-assigned to a after impression i (or the (−j)-th
impression before i, if j < 0).
We next explain the algorithm. Consider an impression i in a randomized round. Suppose it is
semi-assigned to advertisers a1 and a2. Then, sample a
∗ ∈ {a1, a2} and j ∈ {−2,−1, 1, 2} uniformly
at random. If j > 0, select a1 or a2 and the corresponding subsets with a fresh random bit; further,
pass the result to future impression (i+ j)a∗ . If j < 0, check if the past impression (i+ j)a∗ passes
its result to i. If so, makes the opposite choice: select a∗ and the corresponding subset if a∗ was
not selected in round (i+ j)a∗ , and vice versa. Otherwise, select with a fresh random bit.
Finally, we argue this is a 164 -PanOCS. Fix any advertiser a and any point y ∈ [0, Ba). Suppose
i1 < i2 < · · · < ik are the impressions semi-assigned to a and subsets containing y. Consider any
neighboring i` and i`+1. We now use the assumption of large bids to get that i`+1 is the first or
second impression semi-assigned to advertiser a after i`. Hence, i` may pass its result to i`+1, which
may then make the opposite choice. When it happens, y is assigned exactly once in rounds i` and
i`+1. More precisely, this is when i` samples a
∗ = a and j > 0 so that (i` + j)a = i`+1, and i`+1
samples a∗ = a and j < 0 so that (i`+1 + j)a = i`, which happens with probability 164 . Moreover,
we claim that the events are negatively dependent for k−1 neighboring pairs of i` and i`+1. Hence,
the probability of having no such pair is at most (1 − 164)k−1. Finally, even if i1 < i2 < · · · < ik
are independent, the probability that a is never selected is only 2−k. Putting together, y has been
assigned in at least one of these k rounds with probability no less than 1− 2−k(1− 164)k−1.
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4.2 Online Primal Dual Algorithm
We demonstrate an online primal dual Algorithm 1, taking a γ-PanOCS as a blackbox. Recall that
an oblivious semi-randomized algorithm either deterministically assigns i to an advertiser-subset
combination, or semi-assigns it to two combinations in a randomized round. In the latter case, let
the γ-PanOCS select a combination. Let x¯a(y) be the lower bound of xa(y) given by a γ-PanOCS
in Eqn. (4), and let P¯ be the corresponding lower bound of the primal objective in Eqn. (1), i.e.:
x¯a(y)
def
= 1− 2−ka(y) · (1− γ)max{ka(y)−1,0} , P¯ def=
∑
a∈A
∫ Ba
0
x¯a(y)dy .
Let ∆x denote the increment of x¯a(y) as ka(y) increases, i.e.:
∆x(k)
def
=
{
2−1 k = 1 ;
2−k(1− γ)k−2(1 + γ) k ≥ 2 . (5)
An online primal dual algorithm’s decision for each impression is driven by maximizing βi. For
each advertiser a, compute two quantities ∆Da βi and ∆
R
a βi which we shall detail shortly. The former
denotes how much βi would gain if i is assigned to a. The latter denotes how much βi would gain
if i is semi-assigned to a. The corresponding subsets are decided by the panoramic interval-level
assignment in Section 3. Then, find advertisers a1 and a2 with the largest ∆
R
a βi, and advertiser
a∗ with the largest ∆Da βi. If ∆Ra1βi + ∆
R
a2βi is greater than ∆
D
a∗βi, semi-assign i to a1 and a2 in a
randomized round. Otherwise, assign i to a∗ in a deterministic round.
Next, we define ∆Da βi and ∆
R
a βi from two invariants below. First, let the lower bound of primal
equal the dual, i.e., P¯ = D. It ensures reverse weak duality in Lemma 2 because P ≥ P¯ = D.
Second, recall that αa(y)’s account for dual variable αa at the point-level as explained in Eqn. (2).
For a set of parameters ∆α(`), ` ≥ 1, which will be optimized in the analysis, let:
αa(y) =
ka(y)∑
`=1
∆α(`) . (6)
We first derive ∆Ra βi from the invariants. Suppose i is semi-assigned to a and a subset Yai. For
any point y ∈ Yai, the primal increment due to y is ∆x(ka(y) + 1), where ka(y) denotes the value
before the semi-assignment. The dual increment in αa(y) is ∆α(ka(y) + 1) by the second invariant.
Finally, by the first invariant, the increment in βi due to point y ∈ Yai shall equal the difference
between ∆x(ka(y) + 1) and ∆α(ka(y) + 1). For convenience of notations, define:
∆β(k)
def
= ∆x(k)−∆α(k) . (7)
Our choice of ∆α(k) will ensure non-negativity of ∆β(k). Putting together we get that:
∆Ra βi
def
=
∫
Yai
∆β(ka(y) + 1)dy . (8)
Similarly, suppose i is assigned deterministically to a and a subset Yai. For any point y ∈ Yai,
the primal increment due to y is
∑
`>ka(y)
∆x(`) since ka(y) becomes ∞; the dual increment in
αa(y) is
∑
`>ka(y)
∆α(`) by the second invariant. Thus, together with the first invariant, we let:
∆Da βi
def
=
∫
Yai
∑
`>ka(y)
∆β(`)dy . (9)
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Algorithm 1 Basic Online Primal Dual Algorithm (Parameterized by ∆α(k), k ≥ 1)
state variables:
ka(y) ≥ 0, number of times y is semi-assigned; ka(y) =∞ if y is assigned in a deterministic round
for all impression i do
for all advertiser a ∈ A do
computer subset Yai ⊆ [0, Ba) using panoramic interval-level assignment (Section 3)
compute ∆Ra βi and ∆
D
a βi according to Equations (7), (8), and (9)
end for
find a1, a2 that maximize ∆
R
a βi, and a
∗ that maximizes ∆Da βi
if ∆Ra1βi + ∆
R
a2βi ≥ ∆Da∗βi # randomized round
assign i to what PanOCS selects between a1 and a2 and the corresponding subsets
else (i.e., ∆Ra1βi + ∆
R
a2βi < ∆
D
a∗βi) # deterministic round
assign i to a∗ and the corresponding subset
endif
end for
4.3 Online Primal Dual Analysis
Recall that reverse weak duality always holds because of the first invariant. Next, we derive a set
of conditions on the parameters which imply approximate dual feasibility. These conditions will be
numbered. Then, we will optimize the competitive ratio Γ and ∆α(k)’s through an LP. For any
advertiser a and any subset of impressions S ⊆ I, recall approximate dual feasibility in Eqn. (3):∫ Ba
0
αa(y)dy +
∑
i∈S
βi ≥ ba(S) · Γ .
4.3.1 Warmup
First consider a special case when S has only one impression i who bids bai = Ba. This warmup
case is simple enough to be analyzed in around one page, yet is also general enough to derive the
binding conditions on the parameters that are still sufficient in the general case.
We will divide into four subcases, depending on whether impression i is assigned to the advertiser
a, and whether i is a deterministic or randomized round. In each case, we will lower bound both
αa(y)’s and βi as functions of the ka(y)’s. To avoid ambiguity, let ka(y) be the final value at the
end of the algorithm, and kia(y) be the value right before the arrival of impression i.
Case 1: Round of i is randomized, and i is not semi-assigned to a. By definition, both
a1 and a2 chosen by the algorithm contribute at least ∆
R
a βi to βi. Hence, by the definition of ∆
R
a βi
in Eqn. (8) and the invariant about αa(y) in Eqn. (6), approximate dual feasibility reduces to:∫ Ba
0
ka(y)∑
`=1
∆α(`)dy + 2
∫ Ba
0
∆β
(
kia(y) + 1
)
dy ≥ Γ ·Ba .
Since ka(y) ≥ kia(y), and the first term is increasing in ka(y)’s, it suffices to prove the inequality
when ka(y) equals k
i
a(y). We will ensure the inequality pointwisely for every y ∈ [0, Ba):
∀k ≥ 0 :
k∑
`=1
∆α(`) + 2 ·∆β(k + 1) ≥ Γ . (10)
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Case 2: Round of i is deterministic, and i is not assigned to a. We reduce to the previous
case by introducing a condition about the superiority of randomized rounds.
∀k ≥ 1 : ∆β(k) ≥
∞∑
`=k+1
∆β(`) . (11)
Lemma 7. Assuming Eqn. (11), for any advertiser a and any impression i, 2 ·∆Ra βi ≥ ∆Da βi.
We remark that the lemma holds in the general case as well. Adding ∆β(k) to both sides
of Eqn. (11) gives 2 · ∆β(k) ≥ ∑∞`=k ∆β(`). It then follows by the definition of ∆Ra βi and ∆Da βi
in Equations (8) and (9). Intuitively, it means that a randomized round with two equally good
advertisers in terms of ∆Ra βi is better than a deterministic round with only one of them.
By the definition of the algorithm, the advertiser a∗ to which the algorithm deterministically
assigns i satisfies ∆Da∗βi ≥ ∆Ra∗βi + ∆Ra βi. Further by 2 ·∆Ra∗βi ≥ ∆Da∗βi because of Lemma 7, we
have ∆Ra∗βi ≥ ∆Ra βi. Thus, we get βi = ∆Da∗βi ≥ ∆Ra βi + ∆Ra∗βi ≥ 2 ·∆Ra βi. The rest is verbatim.
Case 3: Round of i is randomized, and i is semi-assigned to a. Since the algorithm
chooses not to deterministically assign i to a, we have βi ≥ ∆Da βi. By the definition of ∆Da βi in
Eqn. (9) and the invariant about αa(y)’s in Eqn. (6), approximate dual feasibility reduces to:∫ Ba
0
ka(y)∑
`=1
∆α(`)dy +
∫ Ba
0
∑
`>kia(y)
∆β(`)dy ≥ Γ ·Ba .
Importantly, since i is semi-assigned to a, we have ka(y) ≥ kia(y) + 1. By contrast, the previous
cases only have ka(y) ≥ kia(y). It suffices to ensure the inequality pointwise when ka(y) = kia(y)+1:
∀k ≥ 1 :
k∑
`=1
∆α(`) +
∞∑
`=k
∆β(`) ≥ Γ . (12)
Case 4: Round of i is deterministic, and i is assigned to a. We have ka(y) = ∞ for any
y ∈ [0, Ba) after round i because bai = Ba in the warmup case. Since ka(y) may already be very
large before i arrives, we do not have any nontrivial lower bound of βi. Hence, αa(y)’s on their own
must satisfy approximate dual feasibility. By the invariant of αa(y)’s in Eqn. (6), it reduces to:
∞∑
`=1
∆α(`) ≥ Γ . (13)
Optimizing the competitive ratio. We shall solve an LP, whose variables are the competitive
ratio Γ and parameters ∆α(k)’s and ∆β(k)’s, and whose constraints are the first invariant about
∆α(k)’s and ∆β(k)’s in Eqn. (7) and the sufficient conditions for approximate dual feasibility in
Equations (10) to (13).
maximize Γ
subject to Eqn. (7), (10), (11), (12), and (13)
∆α(k),∆β(k) ≥ 0 ∀k ≥ 1
We will present the solution to the LP after giving the analysis for the general case.
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4.3.2 General Case
We next present a formal proof of approximate dual feasibility in the general case under the invariant
in Eqn. (7), and the conditions derived from the warmup, i.e., Equations (10) to (13). To simplify
the argument, we further assume monotonicity of ∆β:
∀k ≥ 1 : ∆β(k) ≥ ∆β(k + 1) . (14)
We remark that it would be satisfied automatically by the solution of the LP even if it was not
stated explicitly. The LP becomes:
maximize Γ
subject to Eqn. (7), (10), (11), (12), (13), and (14)
∆α(k),∆β(k) ≥ 0 ∀k ≥ 1
(15)
Lemma 8. Suppose Γ, ∆α(k)’s, and ∆β(k)’s form a solution of the LP in Eqn. (15). Then,
Algorithm 1 satisfies approximate dual feasibility, which we restate below:∫ Ba
0
αa(y)dy +
∑
i∈S
βi ≥ ba(S) · Γ .
Recall that reverse weak duality always holds. Lemma 2 leads to the next corollary.
Corollary 9. Algorithm 1 is Γ-competitive for any solution of the LP in Eqn. (15).
Proof of Lemma 8. The values of αa(y)’s are determined by the invariant in Eqn. (6). The points
y which are deterministically assigned are special because αa(y) ≥ Γ by Eqn. (6) and Eqn. (13),
i.e., αa(y) on its own satisfies approximate dual feasibility locally at the point-level. To refer to
these points in the rest of the argument, define:
YD
def
=
{
y ∈ [0, Ba) : y is deterministically assigned by the end of the algorithm
}
.
Similar to the warmup in the last subsection, we will lower bound βi differently depending on
the assignment of the impression i. If i is neither assigned nor semi-assigned to a, we will bound
βi by 2 ·∆Ra βi like case 1 and 2 in the warmup, and will resort to Eqn. (10) and Eqn. (11) and the
corresponding Lemma 7. If i is semi-assigned to a, we will bound βi by ∆
D
a βi like case 3 in the
warmup, and will resort to Eqn. (12). If i is assigned to a deterministically, we will use the trivial
bound of βi ≥ 0 like case 4 in the warmup, and will resort to Eqn. (13). To this end, define:
N
def
=
{
i ∈ S : i is neither assigned nor semi-assigned to a}
R
def
=
{
i ∈ S : i is a randomized round semi-assigned to a}
The rest of the proof is a charging argument as follows. We will find subsets YN , YR ⊆ [0, Ba)
and will distribute the contribution from βi’s for i ∈ N and i ∈ R to the points y ∈ YN and y ∈ YR
respectively by defining β(y)’s such that:
• Subsets YN , YR, and YD are disjoint.
• Subsets YN , YR, and YD have total measure at least ba(S), i.e.:
µ(YN ) + µ(YR) + µ(YD) ≥ ba(S) . (16)
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• The values of β(y)’s lower bound the βi’s, i.e.:∑
i∈N
βi ≥
∫
YN
β(y)dy ; (17)
∑
i∈R
βi ≥
∫
YR
β(y)dy . (18)
• The values of β(y)’s satisfy approximate dual feasibility locally at the point-level, i.e.:
∀y ∈ YN : αa(y) + β(y) ≥ Γ ; (19)
∀y ∈ YR : αa(y) + β(y) ≥ Γ . (20)
Assuming the above, approximate dual feasibility follows by a sequence of inequalities as follows:∫ Ba
0
αa(y)dy +
∑
i∈S
βi ≥
∫ Ba
0
αa(y)dy +
∑
i∈N
βi +
∑
i∈R
βi (N,R ⊆ S and disjoint)
≥
∫ Ba
0
αa(y)dy +
∫
YN
β(y)dy +
∫
YR
β(y)dy (Eqn. (17), (18))
≥
∫
YN∪YR∪YD
αa(y)dy +
∫
YN
β(y)dy +
∫
YR
β(y)dy (YN , YR, YD ⊆ [0, Ba))
=
∫
YN
(
αa(y) + β(y)
)
dy +
∫
YR
(
αa(y) + β(y)
)
dy
+
∫
YD
αa(y)dy (YN , YR, YD disjoint)
≥ Γ · µ(YN ) + Γ · µ(YR) + Γ · µ(YD) (Eqn. (19), (20), (13))
≥ Γ · ba(S) . (Eqn. (16))
The rest of the argument substantiates the above plan by constructing subsets YN , YR, and the
corresponding β(y)’s and proving that they satisfy the aforementioned properties. See Figure 2 for
an illustration of the construction.
Construction of YN and the Corresponding β(y)’s. Similar to case 1 and 2 in the warmup,
we lower bound βi by 2 times ∆
R
a βi. If i is a randomized round, both advertisers a1 and a2 to
which i is semi-assigned contribute at least ∆Ra βi, or else advertiser a should have been chosen
instead. If i is a deterministic round, it is the same argument as in the warmup, which we restate
below for completeness. Since i chooses advertiser a∗ deterministically instead of randomizing
between advertisers a∗ and a, we have βi = ∆Da∗βi ≥ ∆Ra∗βi + ∆Ra βi. Further by Eqn. (11) and
Lemma 7, we have ∆Da∗βi ≤ 2∆Ra∗βi. Cancelling ∆Ra∗βi by combining the two inequalities leads to
βi = ∆
D
a∗βi ≥ 2∆Ra βi. Recall that kia(y)’s denote the values of the state variables when impression
i arrives, and Yai denotes the subset by the panoramic interval-level assignment, should i be semi-
assigned or assigned to advertiser a when it arrives. By the definition of ∆Ra βi in Eqn. (7):
∀i ∈ N : βi ≥ 2
∫
Yai
∆β
(
kia(y) + 1
)
dy . (21)
13
(a) Final status of a (b) Constructions of YD, YN , and YR
Figure 2: Illustrative example of the subsets YD, YN , and YR
We need to further derive a lower bound w.r.t. the ka(y)’s at the end of the algorithm. This
would be easy if we distribute βi to the points y ∈ Yai since ka(y) is nondecreasing over time. Such
a charging may not work, however, because Yai may intersect YD. The next lemma resolves this.
Lemma 10. For any subset Y˜ai with measure at most bai, we have:∫
Yai
∆β(kia(y) + 1)dy ≥
∫
Y˜ai
∆β(ka(y) + 1)dy .
Proof. Since the panoramic interval-level assignment chooses a subset Yai of measure bai with the
minimum kia(y)’s, by the monotonicity of ∆β(·) in Eqn. (14) we have:∫
Yai
∆β(kia(y) + 1)dy ≥
∫
Y˜ai
∆β(kia(y) + 1)dy .
Further observe that ka(y) ≥ kia(y) for any y ∈ [0, Ba). Applying the monotonicity of ∆β(·)
once again proves the lemma.
Before explaining the definition of YN , let us recall some notations defined earlier. Let y
∗ be the
threshold above which y /∈ YD satisfies ka(y) = kmina = minz∈[0,Ba) ka(z), and below which y /∈ YD
satisfies ka(y) = k
min
a + 1 (see panoramic interval-level assignment and Lemma 4 in Section 3). For
any point y ∈ [0, Ba), any subset Y ⊆ [0, Ba), and any 0 ≤ b ≤ Ba, let y ⊕Y b denote the point
in [0, Ba) such that [y, y ⊕Y b) excluding Y has Lebesgue measure b. Further recall our abuse of
notation which allows y ⊕Y b to be smaller than y, in which case [y, y ⊕Y b) denotes the union of
[y,Ba) and [0, y ⊕Y b). In the boundary case when b ≥ Ba − µ(Y ), define y ⊕Y b = y. Define the
inverse operator y 	Y b similarly. We write i′ < i if i′ arrives before i.
For any i ∈ N , define Y˜ai as:
Y˜ai
def
=
[
y∗ ⊕YD
∑
i′∈N : i′<i
bai′ , y
∗ ⊕YD
∑
i′∈N : i′≤i
bai′
)
\ YD . (22)
In other words, we scan through the interval [0, Ba) starting from y
∗ and treating it as a circle
by gluing its endpoints. Then, we construct Y˜ai’s for i ∈ N one at a time by their arrival order,
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letting each be a subset excluding YD with measure up to bai. If
∑
i∈N bai ≤ Ba−µ(YD), which we
consider to be the canonical case, these would be the panoramic interval-level assignments if these
i ∈ N arrived after the final state of the algorithm and were semi-assigned to a.
Finally, the definition of the boundary case ensures that y∗ ⊕YD
∑
i′∈N : i′≤i bai′ = y
∗ when∑
i′∈N : i′≤i bai′ ≥ Ba − µ(YD). Therefore, we stop scanning through [0, Ba) after a full circle, and
the above Y˜ai’s are disjoint.
Define YN and the corresponding β(y) as:
YN
def
=
⋃
i∈N
Y˜ai ,
∀y ∈ YN : β(y) def= 2 ·∆β
(
ka(y) + 1
)
.
(23)
Proof of Eqn. (17). For any i ∈ N , Y˜ai is a subset with measure at most bai by definition. By
Lemma 10 we have: ∫
Yai
∆β(kia(y) + 1)dy ≥
∫
Y˜ai
∆β(ka(y) + 1)dy . (24)
Eqn. (17) then follows by Eqn. (21), the above inequality in Eqn. (24), and the definition of YN
and the correposnding β(y) for y ∈ YN in Eqn. (23) through a sequence of inequalities below:∑
i∈N
βi ≥
∑
i∈N
∫
Yai
2 ·∆β(kia(y) + 1)dy (Eqn. (21))
≥
∑
i∈N
∫
Y˜ai
2 ·∆β(ka(y) + 1)dy (Eqn. (24))
=
∫
YN
β(y)dy . (Eqn. (23))
Proof of Eqn. (19). Writing αa(y) as
∑ka(y)
`=1 ∆α(`) by the invariant in Eqn. (6), and by the
definition of β(y) in Eqn. (23), Eqn. (19) reduces to Eqn. (10), which is a constraint in the LP:
αa(y) + β(y) =
ka(y)∑
`=1
∆α(`) + 2 ·∆β(ka(y) + 1) (Eqn. (6) and (23))
≥ Γ . (Eqn. (10))
Construction of YR and the Corresponding β(y)’s. Similar to case 3 in the warmup, we
lower bound βi by ∆
D
a βi, which holds because the algorithm does not assign i to advertiser a
deterministically. Further by the definition of ∆Da βi in Eqn. (9), we have:
∀i ∈ R : βi ≥
∫
Yai
∞∑
`=kia(y)+1
∆β(`)dy . (25)
We need to further derive a lower bound w.r.t. the ka(y)’s at the end of the algorithm. The
next lemma is similar to Lemma 10 in the previous case, but more generally considers arbitrary
kˆa(y) ≥ kia(y) instead of only the ka(y) at the end of the algorithm.
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Lemma 11. Consider any kˆa(y)’s such that kˆa(y) ≥ kia(y) for any y ∈ [0, Ba). Then, for any
subset Y˜ai with measure at most bai, we have:∫
Yai
∞∑
`=kia(y)+1
∆β(`)dy ≥
∫
Y˜ai
∞∑
`=kˆa(y)+1
∆β(`)dy .
Proof. Since the panoramic interval-level assignment chooses a subset Yai of measure bai with the
minimum kia(y)’s, we have:∫
Yai
∞∑
`=kia(y)+1
∆β(`)dy ≥
∫
Y˜ai
∞∑
`=kia(y)+1
∆β(`)dy .
The lemma then follows by the assumption that kˆa(y) ≥ kia(y) for any y ∈ [0, Ba).
For any i ∈ R, define Y˜ai as:
Y˜ai
def
=
[
y∗ 	YD
∑
i′∈R : i′≥i
bai′ , y
∗ 	YD
∑
i′∈R : i′>i
bai′
)
\ YD . (26)
In other words, scan backwards through the interval [0, Ba) starting from y
∗ and treating it as
a circle by gluing its endpoints. Then, construct Y˜ai’s for i ∈ R one at a time by the opposite of
their arrival order, letting each be a subset excluding YD with measure up to bai. If
∑
i∈N bai ≤
Ba−µ(YD), which we consider to be the canonical case, these would be the panoramic interval-level
assignments if the i ∈ R arrived at the end of the instance, assuming the same final state of the
algorithm. Again, by the definition of the boundary case, we stop scanning through [0, Ba) after a
full circle and, therefore, the above Y˜ai’s are disjoint.
Define YR and the corresponding β(y) as:
YR
def
=
⋃
i∈R
Y˜ai \ YN ,
∀y ∈ YR : β(y) def=
∞∑
`=ka(y)
∆β
(
`
)
.
(27)
Proof of Eqn. (18). For any i ∈ R, define k−ia (y) by considering what the state variables of
advertiser a would have been before the arrival of i if the impressions in R were the latest ones in
the instance. More precisely, for any i ∈ R, let:
k−ia (y)
def
=
ka(y)− 1 y ∈
[
y∗ 	YD
∑
i′∈R : i′≥i bai′ , y
∗) \ YD ;
ka(y) otherwise.
Intuitively, these are the largest possible values of kia(y)’s, as the next lemma formalizes.
Lemma 12. For any i ∈ R and any y ∈ [0, Ba) we have:
k−ia (y) ≥ kia(y) .
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Proof. Suppose for contrary k−ia (y) < kia(y) for some impression i ∈ R some point y ∈ [0, Ba). By
the definition of k−ia (y), this means kia(y) = ka(y) < ∞, and k−ia (y) = ka(y) − 1. Importantly,
by kia(y) = ka(y), the panoramic assignment can only assign or semi-assign impressions after and
including i to points in (y, y∗), and at most once per point. This is the backbone of the proof.
Its first implications is that all impressions i′ ∈ R after and including i are semi-assigned to
disjoint subsets of (y, y∗): ⋃
i′∈R : i′≥i
Yai′ ⊂ (y, y∗) .
Its second implication, which may be less obvious, is that points in YD cannot be semi-assigned
since the arrival of impression i. Consider any point y ∈ YD. If it has already been deterministically
assigned by the time impression i arrives, the claim holds trivially. Otherwise, it can be assigned
or semi-assigned at most once since the arrival of i. This last opportunity must be used for a
deterministic assignment or else y would not be in YD. Together with the first implication, we get
that all impressions i′ ∈ R after and including i are semi-assigned to disjoint subsets of (y, y∗)\YD:⋃
i′∈R : i′≥i
Yai′ ⊂ (y, y∗) \ YD .
However, the LHS has total measure
∑
i′∈R:i′≥i bai′ by definition, and the RHS has total measure
strictly less than that due to k−ia (y) = ka(y)− 1. We have a contradiction.
Consider any i ∈ R. By definition, Y˜ai is a subset with measure at most bai. Further, Lemma 12
above allows us to apply Lemma 11:∫
Yai
∞∑
`=kia(y)+1
∆β(`)dy ≥
∫
Y˜ai
∞∑
`=k−ia (y)+1
∆β(`)dy .
Finally, observe that k−ia (y) = ka(y)− 1 for any y ∈ Y˜ai. We have:∫
Yai
∞∑
`=kia(y)+1
∆β(`)dy ≥
∫
Y˜ai
∞∑
`=ka(y)
∆β(`)dy . (28)
Eqn. (18) then follows by Eqn. (25), the above inequality in Eqn. (28), and the definition of YR
and the correposnding β(y) for y ∈ YR in Eqn. (27), through a sequence of inequalities as follows:∑
i∈R
βi ≥
∑
i∈R
∫
Yai
∞∑
`=kia(y)+1
∆β(`)dy (Eqn. (25))
≥
∑
i∈R
∫
Y˜ai
∞∑
`=ka(y)
∆β(`)dy (Eqn. (28))
≥
∫
YR
β(y)dy . (Eqn. (27))
Proof of Eqn. (20). Writing αa(y) as
∑ka(y)
`=1 ∆α(`) by the invariant in Eqn. (6), and by the
definition of β(y) in Eqn. (27), Eqn. (20) reduces to Eqn. (12), which is a constraint in the LP:
αa(y) + β(y) =
ka(y)∑
`=1
∆α(`) +
∞∑
`=ka(y)
∆β(`) (Eqn. (6) and (27))
≥ Γ . (Eqn. (12))
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Disjointness. This follows directly by the constructions of YN and YR. The construction of YN
explicitly rules out points in YD in Eqn. (22). The construction of YR explicitly rules out points in
YD in Eqn. (26), and rules out points in YR in Eqn. (27).
Bounding the Total Measure: Proof of Eqn. (16). Observe that:⋃
i∈N
Y˜ai =
[
y∗ , y∗ ⊕YD
∑
i∈N
bai
)
\ YD ,
⋃
i∈R
Y˜ai =
[
y∗ 	YD
∑
i∈R
bai , y
∗
)
\ YD .
If
∑
i∈N bai +
∑
i∈R bai ≥ Ba − µ(YD), the union of YD, YN , and YR covers [0, Ba). Eqn. (16)
then holds trivially because the LHS equals Ba and the RHS is upper bounded by Ba.
Otherwise, the definition of YR simplifies as YR = ∪i∈RY˜ai, and we have:
µ(YR) =
∑
i∈R
bai , µ(YN ) =
∑
i∈N
bai .
Finally, any i ∈ S \ (N ∪R) is deterministically assigned to a and therefore:
µ(YD) ≥
∑
i∈S\(N∪R)
bai .
Putting together proves Eqn. (16):
µ(YN ) + µ(YR) + µ(YD) ≥
∑
i∈S
bai ≥ ba(S) .
4.4 Optimizing the Parameters
It remains to optimize the parameters ∆α(k)’s and ∆β(k)’s and the competitive ratio Γ by solving
the LP in Eqn. (15). Observe that the LP has countably infinitely many variables and constraints
and therefore, cannot be directly solved with an LP solver. One possible strategy is to solve a finite
restriction by setting ∆α(k) = ∆β(k) = 0 for k > kmax with some sufficiently large kmax. This is
indeed the strategy we use for the hybrid algorithm in Section 6. Fortunately, the LP in Eqn. (15)
admits benign structures. As a result, we can provide an explicit solution.
Lemma 13. For any 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, the following is a solution of the LP in Eqn. (15):
Γ =
3 + 2γ
6 + 3γ
.
∆α(k) =

3 + γ
6 + 3γ
∆x(1) k = 1 ;
1 + γ
2 + γ
∆x(k) k ≥ 2 .
∆β(k) =

3 + 2γ
6 + 3γ
∆x(1) k = 1 ;
1
2 + γ
∆x(k) k ≥ 2 .
(29)
Proof. Below we verify the constraints of the LP, i.e., Eqn. (7), (10), (11), (12), (13), and (14).
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Eqn. (7): The invariant ∆α(k) + ∆β(k) = ∆x(k) is guaranteed explicitly by the definition of
∆α(k)’s and ∆β(k)’s above.
Eqn. (10): It holds with equality as shown below.
k∑
`=1
∆α(`) + 2 ·∆β(k + 1) = ∆α(1) +
k∑
`=2
∆α(`) + 2 ·∆β(k + 1)
=
3 + γ
6 + 3γ
∆x(1) +
1 + γ
2 + γ
k∑
`=2
∆x(`) +
2
2 + γ
∆x(k + 1)
=
3 + γ
12 + 6γ
+
1 + γ
4 + 2γ
(
1− (1− γ
2
)k−1)
+
1 + γ
4 + 2γ
(1− γ
2
)−k−1
=
3 + 2γ
6 + 3γ
.
Eqn. (11): By definition, we have:
∞∑
`=k+1
∆β(`) =
1
2 + γ
∞∑
`=k+1
∆x(`) .
Next we show: ∞∑
`=k+1
∆x(`) ≤ ∆x(k) .
It holds with equality when k = 1 because both sides equal 12 . When k ≥ 2, it follows by the
observation that ∆x(`+ 1) ≤ 12∆x(`) for any ` ≥ 2.
Together we have:
∞∑
`=k+1
∆β(`) ≤ 1
2 + γ
∆x(k)
The RHS equals ∆β(k) by definition when k ≥ 2. For k = 1, this is less than ∆β(k) due to
3+2γ
6+3γ ≥ 12+γ for any γ ≥ 0. In both cases we get Eqn. (11).
Eqn. (12): First consider k = 1. The constraint holds with strict inequality:
k∑
`=1
∆α(`) +
∞∑
`=k
∆β(`) = ∆α(1) + ∆β(1) +
∞∑
`=2
∆β(`)
= ∆x(1) +
1
2 + γ
∞∑
`=2
∆x(`)
=
1
2
+
1
4 + 2γ
>
3 + 2γ
6 + 2γ
.
The last inequality holds for any γ ≤ 1.
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Next, consider k ≥ 2. The constraint still holds with strict inequality:
k∑
`=1
∆α(`) +
∞∑
`=k
∆β(`) = ∆α(1) +
k−1∑
`=2
∆α(`) +
(
∆α(k) + ∆β(k)
)
+
∞∑
`=k+1
∆β(`)
=
3 + γ
6 + 3γ
∆x(1) +
1 + γ
2 + γ
k−1∑
`=2
∆x(`) + ∆x(k) +
1
2 + γ
∞∑
`=k+1
∆x(`)
=
3 + γ
12 + 6γ
+
1 + γ
4 + 2γ
(
1− (1− γ
2
)k−2)
+
1 + γ
4
(1− γ
2
)k−2
+
1
2
(1− γ
2
)−k−1
=
3 + 2γ
6 + 3γ
+
1
4 + 2γ
(1− γ
2
)−k−1
>
3 + 2γ
6 + 3γ
.
Eqn. (13): It holds with equality. In fact, it can be seen as the limit case of Eqn. (10) or Eqn. (12)
when k goes to infinity. We include the calculation below for completeness.
∞∑
`=1
∆α(`) = ∆α(1) +
∞∑
`=2
∆α(`)
=
3 + γ
6 + 3γ
∆x(1) +
1 + γ
2 + γ
∞∑
`=2
∆x(`)
=
3 + γ
12 + 6γ
+
1 + γ
4 + 2γ
=
3 + 2γ
6 + 3γ
.
Eqn. (14): By ∆x(k) > ∆x(k + 1) and 3+2γ6+3γ ≥ 12+γ , we have ∆β(k) > ∆β(k + 1) from the
definition of ∆β(k)’s. The strict inequality substantiates our earlier remark that the constraint
would be satisfied automatically by the solution of the LP even if it was not stated explicitly.
Large Bids: the Crux of AdWords
In light of the positive results by Mehta et al. [35] for small bids that are at most half the budgets,
the case of large bids, i.e., 12Ba < bai ≤ Ba, can be viewed as the crux of the AdWords problem.
As a direct corollary of Lemma 13 and the 0.05144-PanOCS for large bids in Theorem 5, we get
the first online algorithm that breaks the 0.5 barrier in the crux.
Theorem 14. Suppose all nonzero bids are large, i.e., 12Ba < bai ≤ Ba or bai = 0 for any advertiser
a ∈ A and any impression i ∈ I. Then, Algorithm 1 with the γ = 0.05144-PanOCS in Theorem 5
is Γ-competitive for:
Γ =
3 + 2γ
6 + 3γ
> 0.5041 .
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General Bids: a Weaker Version of Theorem 1
Next, consider a restricted version of Algorithm 1 such that for any advertiser a and any point
y ∈ [0, Ba), y is semi-assigned at most kmax times for some positive integer kmax. This can be
achieved by letting ∆x(k) = ∆α(k) = ∆β(k) = 0 for any k > kmax. The restriction allows us to use
the PanOCS for general bids in Theorem 6. We need, however, a solution to the LP in Eqn. (15)
under the restriction. A natural choice is adopting the solution in Lemma 13 directly for k ≤ kmax,
and decreasing the competitive ratio Γ accordingly to preserve feasibility.
Lemma 15. For any 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, the following is a solution of the LP in Eqn. (15):
Γ =
3 + 2γ
6 + 3γ
− 2−kmax(1− γ)kmax−1 .
∆α(k) =

3 + γ
6 + 3γ
·∆x(1) k = 1 ;
1 + γ
2 + γ
·∆x(k) 2 ≤ k ≤ kmax ;
0 k > kmax .
∆β(k) =

3 + 2γ
6 + 3γ
·∆x(1) k = 1 ;
1
2 + γ
·∆x(k) 2 ≤ k ≤ kmax ;
0 k > kmax .
(30)
Proof. It follows by Lemma 13 that the contributions of ∆α(k)’s and ∆β(k)’s, k > kmax, to the
approximate dual feasibility constraints, i.e., Eqn. (10), (12), and (13), are at most:
∞∑
`=kmax+1
∆x(`) = 2−kmax(1− γ)kmax−1 .
Hence, decreasing the competitive ratio Γ by this amount restores approximate dual feasibility
even after setting ∆α(k) = ∆β(k) = 0 for k > kmax.
Finally, observe that the other constraints, i.e., Eqn. (7), (11), and (14), are trivially preserved
after letting ∆x(k) = ∆α(k) = ∆β(k) = 0 for k > kmax.
Consider the γ-PanOCS in Theorem 6 where γ = 0.01245 · k−1max. The competitive ratio from
the above solution is:
Γ =
3 + 2γ
6 + 3γ
− 2−kmax(1− γ)kmax−1 = 1
2
+ Ω
(
k−1max
)− 2−kmax(1− γ)kmax−1 .
The second term is inverse proportional to kmax while the third term decreases exponentially
in kmax. Hence, by choosing a sufficiently large kmax, the competitive ratio is strictly larger than
half. Indeed, letting kmax = 18 gives Γ > 0.50005.
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5 Panoramic Online Correlated Selection
This section details the design and analysis of the PanOCS algorithms used in the last section. We
first restate the definition of PanOCS below.
Definition 2. A PanOCS is an online algorithm which takes a sequence of pairs of advertiser-
subset combinations as input, and for each pair selects one combination. It is a γ-PanOCS for
some 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1 if for any advertiser a, and any point y ∈ [0, Ba), we have:
xa(y) ≥ 1− 2−ka(y)(1− γ)max{ka(y)−1,0} . (4)
We start with a warmup algorithm in Subsection 5.1 which gives a simple yet weaker 164 -PanOCS
for large bids, substantiating the proof sketch in the previous section. Then, we explain how to
improve and generalize the warmup algorithm to prove Theorem 5 and Theorem 6 in Subsection 5.2
and Subsection 5.3 respectively.
5.1 Warmup: 1
64
-PanOCS for Large Bids
This subsection explains the basics of PanOCS algorithms and their analyses through a proof of
the following theorem.
Theorem 16 (Weaker Version of Theorem 5). Suppose all nonzero bids are large, i.e., we have
1
2Ba < bai ≤ Ba or bai = 0 for any a ∈ A and any i ∈ I. Then, there is a 164 ≈ 0.0156-PanOCS.
We adopt the concepts and ex-ante and ex-post dependence graphs from the research on OCS
by Huang and Tao [18, 19]. To avoid confusion with the vertices and edges in the bipartite graph of
AdWords, we shall refer to the counterparts in the dependence graphs as nodes and arcs respectively.
Ex-ante Dependence Graph. Let IR denote the set of impressions in randomized rounds. The
ex-ante dependence graph D is a directed graph with a node for every impression i ∈ IR; we abuse
notation and refer to the node also as i. Recall that we write i < i′ if i arrives before i′.
Definition 3 (Correlation among Randomized Rounds). Suppose i < i′ are two impressions semi-
assigned to an advertiser a and to subsets Yai and Yai′ respectively.
1. They are related w.r.t. advertiser a if the subsets overlap, i.e., if there exists y ∈ Yai ∩ Yai′ .
2. If further there is no impression i′′ between them, i.e., i < i′′ < i′, which is also semi-assigned
to advertiser a and a subset containing y, we say that i < i′ are adjacent w.r.t. advertiser a.
3. Otherwise, we say that i < i′ are unrelated w.r.t. advertiser a.
For large bids, two impressions semi-assigned to the same advertiser a are always related. We
make the above definition more general so that it applies to arbitrary bids.
Let there be an arc (i, i′)a in the ex-ante dependence graph D if i < i′ are adjacent w.r.t. a.
The subscript helps distinguish parallel arcs, when i and i′ are semi-assigned to the same pairs of
advertisers (yet potentially distinct subsets). See Figure 3 for an illustrative example.
Further, we sometimes say that i < i′ are related or adjacent without specifying an advertiser,
which means the relation holds for some advertiser a. Similarly, we say that i < i′ are unrelated
without specifying an advertiser, which means they are unrelated w.r.t. any advertiser a.
Informally, our PanOCS ensures that for any pair of adjacent nodes i < i′, with probability γ
the γ-PanOCS correlates the decisions perfectly negatively: it selects advertiser a in round i′ if it
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Figure 3: Example of ex-ante dependence graph
does not select a in round i, and vice versa. Further, if two nodes are related, the selections therein
are either independent or negatively correlated. Finally, if two nodes are unrelated, the selections
could be arbitrarily correlated. In this subsection and the next, the PanOCS algorithms for large
bids make pairwise independent decisions for unrelated nodes. The PanOCS for general bids in the
last subsection, however, crucially utilizes the freedom of correlating unrelated nodes positively.
Lemma 17. If all nonzero bids are large, any i ∈ IR has at most 4 out-arcs and at most 4 in-arcs.
Proof. Fix any impression i ∈ IR. Let a and a′ be the advertisers chosen in this randomized round.
We will show that there are at most two out-arcs (i, i′)a w.r.t. advertiser a. Then, by symmetric
arguments, there are at most two out-arcs w.r.t. advertiser a′, and at most two in-arcs w.r.t. each
of a and a′. Putting together proves the lemma.
Let i1 and i2 be the next two randomized rounds after i which semi-assign to advertiser a. We
claim that i has no out-arcs to any node other than i1 and i2 w.r.t. advertiser a, because when bids
are large every point y ∈ [0, Ba) is semi-assigned at least once in rounds i1 and i2. Hence, i < i′
cannot be adjacent for any later impression i′ 6= i1, i2 because for any choice of y ∈ [0, Ba) there
always exists i′′ = i1 or i2 such that i < i′′ < i′ and y ∈ Yai′′ .
Ex-post Dependence Graph. The PanOCS algorithms in this paper follow the same recipe:
construct a random subgraph D∗ of D; then, for every arc (i, i′)a in the subgraph D∗, it correlates
the selections in i and i′ perfectly negatively. We call D∗ the ex-post dependence graph. The
subgraph D∗ must not introduce positive correlation among related nodes. For instance, we cannot
include both (i, i′)a and (i′, i′′)a in D∗ if i and i′′ are related, or else the decisions in i and i′′ will be
perfectly positively correlated. We construct D∗ to be a random matching. Hence, conditioned on
any realization of D∗, any pair of nodes are either independent or perfectly negatively correlated.
Concretely, on the arrival of each node i, we pick an incident arc randomly each with probability
1
8 ;
2 an arc of D is included in D∗ if both incident nodes pick it. See Algorithm 2.
2Even though the out-arcs have yet to reveal themselves, the PanOCS may reference them as the first and second
out-arcs w.r.t each of the two chosen advertisers.
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Algorithm 2 Panoramic Online Correlated Selection (Large Bids, γ = 164)
for all impression i ∈ IR do
add arcs from i′ to i to D for every existing i′ that correlates with i
randomly pick one of its at most 8 incident arc in D, each with probability 18
if it picks an in-arc, say, (i′, i)a, and i′ also picks the arc then
add arc (i′, i)a to D∗
select a if it does not select a for i′, and select a′ otherwise (i.e., the opposite selection)
else
select with a fresh random bit
end if
end for
Proof of Theorem 16. Fix any advertiser a and any point y ∈ [0, Ba). Let i1 < i2 < · · · < ik be
the subset of impressions that are semi-assigned to advertiser a and subsets containing y. Suppose
there exists an arc in D∗ between a pair of these nodes. Then, Algorithm 2 picks advertiser a
in exactly one of these two rounds.3 If no such arc exists, Algorithm 2 picks a with probability
half independently in each of the k rounds; the probability that a is never chosen is 2−k. Hence, it
suffices to show that the probability that there is no arc in D∗ among i1 to ik is at most (1− 164)k−1.
In fact, we will show a slightly stronger result. For any 0 ≤ m ≤ k, let Fm denote the event
that no arc of the form (ij , ij+1)a exists among the first m nodes. Let fm denotes its probability.
Observe that when m = k, this is a necessary condition of the event we seek to analyze. Hence, it
is sufficient to bound the probability of Fk. We claim that fm is recursively defined as follows:
f0 = f1 = 1, fm = fm−1 − 1
64
fm−2 . (31)
Observe that fm−2 ≥ fm−1 because Fm−1 is a subevent of Fm−2. The desired bound follows by:
fm = fm−1 − 1
64
fm−2 ≤
(
1− 1
64
)
fm−1 .
The base cases of Eqn. (31) are trivial. It remains to show the recurrence. To do so, we further
introduce an auxiliary subevent Gm for any 1 ≤ m ≤ k − 1, which not only requires Fm, but also
that the last impression im picks arc (im, im+1)a. Let gm denote the probability of the subevent.
For the subevent to happen, the last impression im must pick a specific arc (im, im+1)a, which
happens with probability 18 . This choice of im further ensures that arc (im−1, im) cannot be realized.
Therefore, the rest of the restriction is simply that no arc (ij , ij+1)a is realized in the first m − 1
rounds. Hence:
gm =
1
8
fm−1 .
For the original event to happen, on the other hand, there are two cases. The first case is when
im picks arc (im−1, im)a, which happens with probability 18 . In this case the rest of the restriction
requires not only that no arc (ij , ij+1)a is realized in the first m−1 rounds, but also that impression
im−1 cannot pick arc (im−1, im)a. In other word, it corresponds to the event w.r.t. the first m− 1
rounds, excluding the subevent. The other case is when im picks one of the other 7 arcs, which
happens with probability 78 . In this case it once again reduces to having no arc (ij , ij+1)a realized
in the first m− 1 rounds. Putting together we have:
fm =
1
8
(
fm−1 − gm−1
)
+
7
8
fm−1 .
3Importantly, this holds even if the arc was due to an advertiser other than a.
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Algorithm 3 Panoramic Online Correlated Selection (Large Bids)
parameter: 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, the probability of being a sender
for all impression i ∈ IR do
add arc (i′, i)a to D for any existing i′ adjacent to i w.r.t. some advertiser a s.t. bai, bai′ > Ba2
i is a sender with probability p:
select with a fresh random bit
randomly pick an out-arc in D, each with probability 14
i is a receiver with probability 1− p:
if some sender i′ picks an in-arc (i′, i)a of i in D then
randomly pick such an in-arc (i′, i)a and add it to D∗
select a if it does not select a for i′, and vice versa (i.e., the opposite selection)
else
select with a fresh random bit
end if
end for
Cancelling gm using the previous equation proves Eqn. (31).
5.2 Large Bids: Proof of Theorem 5
We further adopt the nomenclature from the research on OCS [18, 19]. In the warmup PanOCS
in the last subsection, whenever a node i picks an out-arc, say, (i, i′)a, the PanOCS uses a fresh
random bit to select an advertiser-subset combination in the round i; further, the selection of round
i is ready to be received by node i′ should i′ also picks arc (i, i′)a. To this end, we call node i a
sender if it picks an out-arc, and call it a receiver otherwise. In the warmup algorithm, a sender’s
random bit is sent to one other node, which is received only if the other node chooses to be a
receiver and further the randomly chosen in-arc happens to be the one from the sender.
Next, we refine the italic part above to obtain the improved ratio in Theorem 5. We still let each
node be a sender or a receiver randomly. Further, each sender still sends its selection to a random
out-neighbor. Each receiver, however, proactively checks whether any in-neighbors are senders who
pick its corresponding in-arcs. If so, it randomly picks one such in-arc. Finally, we optimize the
probability of letting a node be a sender to obtain the ratio stated in Theorem 5.
We further define the algorithm more generally for arbitrary bids, where the correlation occurs
only among large ones. The more general definition will be useful in the hybrid algorithm in the
next section. See Algorithm 3.
The next lemma analyzes Algorithm 3 for any choice of sender probability 0 < p < 1. Theorem 5,
i.e., γ = 0.05144, is a corollary with the optimal p = 49 .
Lemma 18. If all nonzero bids are large, Algorithm 3 is a γ-PanOCS for:
γ =
1
4
(
1− p)p(1− 3p
8
)
. (32)
Recall the intuition behind a γ-PanOCS: any two adjacent impressions (which correspond to
two neighboring nodes in D) are perfectly negatively correlated (which correspond to being in D∗)
with probability γ; moreover, the events are as least as good as independent. Before diving into
a formal proof of Lemma 18, we explain the intuition why the marginal probability of realizing
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an arc (i′, i)a in D∗ may be the above value of γ. For an arc to be in D∗, i must be a receiver,
which happens with probability 1− p, and must pick arc (i′, i)a, which happens with probability 14 .
Further, i′ must be a receiver, which happens with probability p. Conditioned on all of the above,
what is the chance that (i′, i)a is in D∗? Each in-neighbor is a sender with probability p, picks the
in-arc of i with probability 14 , and finally wins over (i
′, i)a with probability 12 . Hence, the three
in-arcs of i other than (i′, i)a together prevent i from choosing (i′, i)a with probability at most 3p8 .
This overestimation of the failure probability gives the stated value of γ.
We will in fact prove the following lemma that further applies to the more general case with a
mixture of large and small bids. Lemma 18 follows as a direct corollary. The more general lemma
will be useful in the hybrid algorithm in the next section. For any advertiser a and any any point
y ∈ [0, Ba), let kLa (y) ≤ ka(y) denote the number of impressions semi-assigned to advertiser a and
subsets containing y whose bids are at least Ba2 , before the first time y is semi-assigned to a small
bid, i.e., smaller than Ba2 . If y has never been semi-assigned to a small bid, let k
L
a (y) = ka(y).
Lemma 19. For the γ in Eqn. (32), Algorithm 3 satisfies that for any advertiser a and any point
y ∈ [0, Ba), y is assigned at least once with probability at least:
1− 2−ka(y) · (1− γ)max{kLa (y)−1,0} .
Proof. Fix any advertiser a and any point y ∈ [0, Ba). Let i1 < i2 < · · · < ika(y) be the impressions
semi-assigned to advertiser a and subsets containing y. If there is an arc in the ex-post dependence
graph D∗ between two of them, point y is assigned in exactly one of the two rounds. Otherwise,
each of the k rounds independently has probability half of assigning y; there is only a 2−ka(y)
probability that y is never assigned. Hence, it remains to analyze the former event and show that
the probability of having no arc among i1 < i2 < · · · < ik in the ex-post dependence graph D∗ is
at most (1 − γ)kLa (y)−1 for the stated value of γ in the lemma. We will upper bound this by the
probability of having no arcs among the first kLa (y) impressions i1 < i2 < · · · < ikLa (y).
Concretely, for any 0 ≤ m ≤ kLa (y), let Fm denote the event that there is no arc in D∗ among
i`, 1 ≤ ` ≤ m. Let fm denote the probability of Fm. Trivially we have f0 = f1 = 1.
Next, we inductively derive the following upper bound of fm for 2 ≤ m ≤ kLa (y):
fm ≤ (1− γ) · fm−1 .
To do so, further consider an auxiliary subevent Gm of Fm for any 1 ≤ m ≤ kLa (y) − 1, which
further requires that im is a sender who picks arc (im, im+1)a. Let gm be the probability of Gm.
Auxiliary Event. In order to have event Gm, we need:
1. Node im is a sender (probability p);
2. Node im picks (im, im+1)a (probability
1
4); and
3. Event Fm−1 (probability fm−1).
These conditions are independent since they rely on disjoint subsets of random bits. We have:
gm =
p
4
fm−1 . (33)
Main Event. Next we turn to event Fm. There are two subcases: im is a sender, or a receiver.
26
Case 1: Sender. If im is a sender, Fm cannot fail due to a pair of nodes including im. Hence, it
remains to ensure Fm−1. The contribution of this case to the probability of Fm is:
pfm−1 (34)
Case 2: Receiver. In this case, we need to further ensure that Fm does not fail due to a pair of
nodes including im. There are at most 4 in-arcs of concern. First, there is always an arc (im−1, im)a
in D. Further, there may some other arcs, either from im−2 to im w.r.t. advertiser a, or from some
i`, 1 ≤ ` ≤ m − 1 w.r.t. other advertisers. Let n ≤ 3 be the number of in-arcs of the latter form.
The binding case of the analysis is when n = 0, which we shall demonstrate first.
Case 2a: n = 0. The only arc incident to im of concern is (im−1, im)a. As a result, it is sufficient
(but not necessary in general) if the first m− 1 rounds are in Fm−1 \Gm−1. This part contributes:
(1− p)(fm−1 − gm−1) . (35)
Even if the first m − 1 rounds are in Gm−1, there may not be a perfect negative correlation
between the selections of impressions im−1 and im, due to the competition from the other in-arcs
of im in D. Concretely, there are 3 in-arcs other than (im−1, im)a. Moreover, by the assumption of
the subcase, these in-arcs are not from i` for any 1 ≤ ` ≤ m− 2.
Suppose the in-arcs are further from 3 distinct nodes. Then, each is a sender who picks im with
probability p4 independently. The probability that im picks im−1 equals:
3∑
i=0
1
i+ 1
(
p
4
)i(
1− p
4
)3−i(3
i
)
=
3∑
i=0
1
4
(
p
4
)i(
1− p
4
)3−i( 4
i+ 1
)
=
1
p
(
1− (1− p
4
)4)
.
Through a similar calculation, we further conclude that if there are two in-arcs from the same
node, the probability that im picks im−1 is 1 − 38p + 124p2. The bounds in both cases are greater
than 1− 38p for any 0 ≤ p ≤ 1.
Hence, the contribution of this part to the probability of Fm is at most:
(1− p)
(
1− (1− 3p
8
))
gm−1 . (36)
Summing up the contributions in Equations (34), (35), and (36), cancelling gm−1 using Eqn. (33),
and plugging in the value of γ, we have:
fm ≤ fm−1 − γ · fm−2 ≤ (1− γ)fm−1 .
Case 2b: 1 ≤ n ≤ 3. We will show that the probability of Fm in this case is upper bounded by
the previous case. In this case, having the first m−1 rounds in Fm−1\Gm−1 is no longer a sufficient
condition since there may still be an arc from i`, 1 ≤ ` ≤ m − 2 to im. Nonetheless, Eqn. (34) is
still an upper bound of the contribution of this part.
Next, consider the case when the first m− 1 rounds are in Gm−1. Comparing with the previous
case, the main difference is that im may have in-arcs in D other than (im−1, im)a from some i`,
1 ≤ ` ≤ m− 1. However, should im pick one of these in-arcs, we still get that y has been selected.
Intuitively, it is less likely than the previous case that im picks an in-arc not from i`, 1 ≤ ` ≤ m−1.
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Formally, fix any realization of randomness in the first m− 1 rounds in Gm−1. Suppose n′ ≤ n
in-neighbors of im of the form i`, 1 ≤ ` ≤ m − 2, are senders who pick the arc to im. If each of
the 3 − n other in-arcs from from distinct nodes, each of the 3 − n other in-neighbors is a sender
who picks the arc to im independently with probability
p
4 . The probability that im picks one of the
in-arcs from in-neighbors of the form i` is:
3−n∑
i=0
1 + n′
i+ n′ + 1
(
p
4
)i(
1− p
4
)3−n−i(3− n
i
)
≥
3−n∑
i=0
1
i+ 1
(
p
4
)i(
1− p
4
)3−n−i(3− n
i
)
=
3−n∑
i=0
1
4− n
(
p
4
)i(
1− p
4
)3−n−i(4− n
i+ 1
)
=
4
(4− n)p
(
1− (1− p
4
)4−n)
.
Observe that x−1
(
1 − (1 − p4)x
)
is decreasing in x, the above is greater than the bound in the
previous case which corresponds to n = 0.
Finally, if there are two of the 3−n other in-arcs are from the same neighbor, it must be n = 1.
This in-neighbor is a sender who picks one of these two arcs with probability p2 . We have a similar
calculation for the probability that im picks one of the in-arcs from in-neighbors of the form i`:
p
2
· 1 + n
′
2 + n′
+
(
1− p
2
) ≥ p
2
· 1
2
+
(
1− p
2
)
= 1− p
4
,
which is also greater than the 1− 3p8 bound needed in the analysis.
5.3 General Bids: Proof of Theorem 6
Challenge. In the presence of both large and small bids, a semi-assignment of an impression i
to an advertiser-subset combination (a, Yai) may be adjacent to an arbitrary number of subsequent
semi-assignments of smaller bids. For instance, consider an impression with a large bid bai = Ba
followed by n impressions with small bids bai′ =
Ba
n . Therefore, the previous approach of letting
each impression randomly picks an out-arc in the ex-ante dependence graph D no longer works
because the probability that an arc (i, i′)a in the ex-ante dependence graph D is included in the
ex-post dependence graph D∗ may be arbitrarily small.
Solution. For any advertiser a, we will partition the impressions semi-assigned to a with small
bids into groups. Then, define group-level correlation similar to the case of large bids, treating
the union of impressions within the same group as a single large bid. We will argue that each
group is correlated with a bounded number of other groups. Finally, recall that any impression in a
randomized round is associated with two advertisers and thus, belongs to two groups, one for each
advertiser. Pick one of the two groups randomly and follow its decision.
It is worth remarking that the impressions in the same group are positively correlated. Hence,
two impressions in the same group, say, w.r.t. an advertiser a must be unrelated. In other words,
other than the common advertiser a, the two impressions are semi-assigned to either two distinct
advertisers, or the same advertiser but disjoint subsets.
The rest of the subsection will substantiate the above intuition with a formal definition of the
algorithm and its analysis. We will build on the notions of two nodes’ being related, adjacent, and
unrelated (Definition 3).
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First-level Partition. For each advertiser a, let IRa denote the set of randomized round which
semi-assign the impressions to a. We shall greedily partition IRa into subsets of impressions that
are pairwise unrelated w.r.t. advertiser a, denoted as Ija, j ≥ 1.
1. Initialize ja = 1 and I
j
a = ∅ for any j ≥ 1.
2. For each impression i ∈ IRa :
(a) Let ja ← ja + 1 if impression i is adjacent to the first impression in Ijaa w.r.t. a.
(b) Let Ijaa ← Ijaa ∪ {i}.
Next we establish several properties of the above greedy partition. By the above definition and
the panoramic interval-level assignment in Section 3, we have:
Lemma 20. Any two impressions in the same subset Ija are unrelated w.r.t. advertiser a.
The next property shows that the subsets restore the main structural property of large bids,
i.e., Lemma 17. Indeed, if all bids were large, each impression would be a subset on its own.
Lemma 21. For any neighboring subsets Ija and I
j+1
a , and any point y ∈ [0, Ba) which is not
deterministically assigned, y is semi-assigned at least once in the rounds in Ija and I
j+1
a .
Proof. In fact, we will show a stronger claim that the rounds in subset Ija and the first round in
Ij+1a suffice. By the definition of the greedy partition algorithm, the subset of [0, Ba) chosen in the
first round in Ij+1a intersects with the subset of the first round in I
j
a; otherwise, it would have been
added to Ija instead. Hence, the points in this intersection have already been semi-assigned twice.
Finally, by the panoramic interval-level assignment in Section 3, any point y ∈ [0, Ba) that has not
been deterministically assigned thus far must have been semi-assigned at least once.
This lemma has two direct corollaries.
Corollary 22. For any advertiser a there are at most 2kmax nonempty subsets I
j
a.
Corollary 23. Suppose two impressions belong to subsets Ija and Ika respectively, where k > j + 2.
Then, they are not adjacent w.r.t. a.
Second-level Partition. An pair of impressions in the same subset Ija could still be related or
even adjacent w.r.t. an advertiser other than a. To resolve this we further introduce another layer
of partition of each Ija into ∪kIj,ka as follows:
∀k ∈ Z+ : Ij,ka = Ija ∩
( ⋃
a′ 6=a
Ika′
)
. (37)
In other words, an impression i is in Ij,ka if it belongs to the j-th subset I
j
a w.r.t. advertiser a
in the first-level partition, and further belongs to the k-th subset Ika′ of the other advertiser a
′ to
which i is semi-assigned. We shall refer to each Ij,ka as a group of impressions.
As a corollary of Lemma 20, we have:
Corollary 24. Any two impressions in the same group Ij,ka are unrelated.
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Group-level Decision. Fix any advertiser a ∈ A. We say that two groups Ij,ka and Ij
′,k′
a are
adjacent if there exist impressions i ∈ Ij,ka and i′ ∈ Ij
′,k′
a such that i and i′ are adjacent w.r.t. a.
Then, as a further corollary of Lemma 20, Corollary 22, and Corollary 23, we have:
Corollary 25. Any group Ij,ka is adjacent to at most 8kmax other groups I
j′,k′
a , whose superscripts
are j′ ∈ {j − 2, j − 1, j + 1, j + 2} and 1 ≤ k′ ≤ 2kmax.
The group-level (negative) correlation is achieved using the following algorithm similar to the
PanOCS for large bids, treating each group as a large bid. For each group Ij,ka , it returns either a
or ¬a with 50-50 marginal probability.
Concretely, define an ex-ante dependence graph Da for each advertiser a. Let there be a node for
each group Ij,ka . Further, let there be an arc from I
j,k
a to I
j′,k′
a if they are adjacent, and j < j′. The
second condition indicates that arcs are from earlier groups to later ones. The algorithm constructs
an ex-post dependence graph D∗a similar to the PanOCS for large bids. It is parameterized by
0 < p < 1, the probability of letting each group be a sender. For each group:
1. With probability p, let it be a sender :
(a) Pick a subsequent adjacent group Ij
′,k′
a , j′ ∈ {j + 1, j + 2}, 1 ≤ k′ ≤ 2kmax, randomly.
(b) Return a or ¬a uniformly at random with a fresh random bit.
2. Otherwise, let it be a receiver :
(a) If there exists a previous adjacent group Ij
′,k′
a which is a sender and picks I
j,k
a , makes
the opposite decision, i.e., return a if group Ij
′,k′
a returns ¬a, and vice versa.
(b) Otherwise, return a or ¬a uniformly at random with a fresh random bit.
Impression-level Decision. Recall that the impression of each randomized round is associated
with two advertisers a and a′ and thus, two corresponding groups Ij,ka and Ij
′,k′
a′ . Follow the decision
of one of the groups, chosen uniformly at random. By following the decision of a group, say, Ij,ka ,
the PanOCS picks a if the group picks a, and picks a′ if the group picks ¬a.
The PanOCS for general bids is summarized in Algorithm 4. We next show a general analysis
of the algorithm for any value of 0 < p < 1.
Lemma 26. Algorithm 4 is a γ-PanOCS, where:
γ =
1
16kmax
(
1− p)(1− (1− p
4kmax
)4kmax) .
Then, Theorem 6 follows as a corollary, observing the stated value of γ is at least:
1
16kmax
(1− p)(1− e−p) ,
and letting p = 2−W (e2) ≈ 0.44285 to maximize it, where W (·) is the product logarithm.
Proof. Fix any advertiser a and any point y ∈ [0, Ba). Let i1 < i2 < · · · < ik be the impressions
semi-assigned to advertiser a and subsets containing y. Let j1 < j2 < · · · < jk be the subsets such
that i` ∈ Ij`a . Recall that each subset Ij`a is further partitioned into groups and the impression i`
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Algorithm 4 Panoramic Online Correlated Selection (General Bids, Parameter 0 < p < 1)
initialize ja = 1, I
j
a = ∅, and Ij,ka = ∅ for any a ∈ A, any j ≥ 1, and any 1 ≤ k ≤ 2kmax.
for all group Ij,ka do
# group-level decision
with probability p, let it be a sender:
let its decision be a or ¬a with a fresh random bit
randomly pick an Ij
′,k′
a , j′ ∈ {j + 1, j + 2}, 1 ≤ k′ ≤ 2kmax, as the potential receiver
otherwise, i.e., with probability 1− p, let it be a receiver:
randomly pick a sender Ij
′,k′
a , j′ ∈ {j − 1, j − 2}, 1 ≤ k′ ≤ 2kmax, who picks Ij,ka
let Ij,ka ’s decision be a if I
j′,k′
a ’s decision is ¬a, and vise versa
if no such Ij
′,k′
a exists, let its decision be a or ¬a with a fresh random bit
end for
for all impression i ∈ IR, say, semi-assigned to (a, S) and (a′, S′) do
# 1st-level partition
let ja ← ja + 1 if i is adjacent to the first impression in Ijaa w.r.t. a
let ja′ ← ja′ + 1 if i is adjacent to the first impression in Ija′a′ w.r.t. a′
let Ijaa ← Ijaa ∪ {i}, and Ija′a′ ← I
ja′
a′ ∪ {i}
# 2nd-level partition
let I
ja,ja′
a ← Ija,ja′a ∪ {i} and Ija′ ,jaa′ ← I
ja′ ,ja
a′ ∪ {i}
# impression-level decision
follow either I
ja,ja′
a or I
ja′ ,ja
a′ ’s decision, each with probability half
end for
belongs to exactly one group. Nonetheless, the index in the second-level partition is unimportant
for the argument; we write the group as Ij`,∗a .
Suppose there exists an arc in the ex-post dependence graph D∗a between two of I
j`,∗
a , 1 ≤ ` ≤ k,
and further the PanOCS chooses to follows Ij`,∗a ’s decision in these two rounds. Then, point y
is assigned in exactly one of the two rounds. Otherwise, each of the k rounds independently has
probability half of assigning y. Hence, it remains to analyze the former event and upper bound the
probability that it does not happen by (1− γ)k−1, for the stated value of γ in the lemma.
Concretely, for any 0 ≤ m ≤ k, let Fm denote the event that for any two nodes Ij`,∗a , 1 ≤ ` ≤ m,
either there is no arc in D∗a between them, or the PanOCS does not follow their decisions in at
least one of the two rounds. Let fm denote the probability of Fm. Trivially we have f0 = f1 = 1.
Next, we inductively derive the following upper bounds of fm for 2 ≤ m ≤ k:
fm ≤ (1− γ) · fm−1 .
To do so, further consider an auxiliary subevent Gm of Fm for any 1 ≤ m ≤ k−1, which further
requires that Ijm,∗a is a sender who picks I
jm+1,∗
a and the PanOCS follows I
jm,∗
a ’s decision. Let gm
be the probability of Gm.
Auxiliary Event. In order to have event Gm, we need:
1. The PanOCS follows Ijm,∗a ’s decision (probability 12);
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2. Node Ijm,∗a is a sender (probability p);
3. Node Ijm,∗a picks I
jm+1,∗
a (probability
1
4kmax
); and
4. Event Fm−1 (probability fm−1).
Further observe that these conditions are independent since they rely on disjoint subsets of
random bits. We have:
gm =
p
8kmax
fm−1 . (38)
Main Event. Next we turn to event Fm. There are two cases depending on the conditions below,
which are independent because they rely on disjoint subsets of random bits.
1. The PanOCS follows Ijm,∗a ’s decision (probability 12);
2. Node Ijm,∗a is a receiver (probability 1− p).
Case 1: Last Node Does Not Matter. If at least one of the above conditions do not hold,
Fm cannot fail due to a pair of nodes including I
jm,∗
a . Hence, it remains to ensure Fm−1. The
contribution of this case to the probability of Fm is:(
1− 1− p
2
)
fm−1 (39)
Case 2: Last Node Matters. If both conditions hold, we need to further ensure that Fm does
not fail due to a pair of nodes including Ijm,∗a . There are two pairs of nodes of concern. First,
there is always an arc from I
jm−1,∗
a to I
jm,∗
a in Da. We need either that the arc is not realized in
D∗a, or that the PanOCS does not follows I
jm−1,∗
a ’s decision. Here, recall the assumption that the
PanOCS does follow Ijm,∗a ’s decision. The second pair of nodes is I
jm−2,∗
a and I
jm,∗
a . There may
or may not be an arc between them in the ex-ante dependence graph Da, depending on whether
jm = jm−2 + 2. This further divides the rest of the analysis into two subcases
Case 2a. The first subcase is when jm > jm−2 + 2, which is also the bottleneck of the analysis.
Then, there cannot be an arc from I
jm−2,∗
a to I
jm,∗
a in the dependence graphs. The only arc of
concern is from I
jm−1,∗
a to I
jm,∗
a . As an immediate implication, it is sufficient (but not necessary in
general) if the first m− 1 rounds are in Fm−1 \Gm−1. The contribution of this part is:
1− p
2
(
fm−1 − gm−1
)
. (40)
Even if the first m − 1 rounds are in Gm−1, there may not be a perfect negative correlation
between the decisions of impressions im−1 and im, due to the competition from other in-neighbors
of Ijm,∗a in Da. Concretely, there are 4kmax − 1 in-neighbors other than Ijm−1,∗a . Further, by the
assumption of the subcase, these in-neighbors are not Ij`a for any 1 ≤ ` ≤ m − 2 Hence, each of
them independently has probability p4kmax of being a sender who picks I
jm,∗
a . The probability that
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Ijm,∗a picks I
jm−1,∗
a instead of one of these competitors is equal to:
4kmax−1∑
i=0
1
i+ 1
(
p
4kmax
)i(
1− p
4kmax
)4kmax−1−i(4kmax − 1
i
)
=
4kmax−1∑
i=0
1
4kmax
(
p
4kmax
)i(
1− p
4kmax
)4kmax−1−i(4kmax
i+ 1
)
=
1
p
(
1− (1− p
4kmax
)4kmax) .
Hence, the contribution of this part to the probability of Fm is:
1− p
2
(
1− 1
p
(
1− (1− p
4kmax
)4kmax))gm−1 . (41)
Summing up the contributions in Equations (39), (40), and (41), cancelling gm−1 using Eqn. (38),
and plugging in the value of γ, we have:
fm = fm−1 − γ · fm−2 ≤ (1− γ)fm−1 .
Case 2b. The second subcase is when jm = jm−2 + 2. We will show that the probability of Fm
is upper bounded by the previous case. In this case, having the first m− 1 rounds in Fm−1 \Gm−1
is no longer a sufficient condition since there may still be an arc I
jm−2,∗
a to I
jm,∗
a . Nonetheless,
Eqn. (40) is still an upper bound of the contribution of this part.
Next, consider the case when the first m− 1 rounds are in Gm−1. Comparing with the previous
case, the main difference is that I
jm−2,∗
a is also an in-neighbor of I
jm,∗
a in Da. However, I
jm−2,∗
a
serve as an competitor only when the PanOCS does not follow its decision; otherwise, having an
arc from I
jm−2,∗
a to I
jm,∗
a in the ex-post dependence graph D∗a also precludes event Gm−1.
Next, we argue that Eqn. (41) continues to serve as an upper bound of the contribution from
this part. Formally, let H denote the event that I
jm−2,∗
a is a sender who picks I
jm,∗
a , and further
the PanOCS does not follow I
jm−2,∗
a ’s decision. We show that conditioned on Gm−1, event H holds
with probability at most p4kmax . Observe the intersection of events Gm−1 and H is equivalent to
the following collection of independent conditions:
1. The PanOCS follows I
jm−1,∗
a ’s decision (probability
1
2);
2. Node I
jm−1,∗
a is a sender (probability p);
3. Node I
jm−1,∗
a picks I
jm,∗
a (probability
1
4kmax
);
4. The PanOCS does not follows I
jm−2,∗
a ’s decision (probability
1
2);
5. Node I
jm−2,∗
a is a sender (probability p);
6. Node I
jm−2,∗
a picks I
jm,∗
a (probability
1
4kmax
); and
7. Event Fm−3 (probability fm−3).
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Putting together, the joint event happens with probability:
p2
32k2max
fm−3 .
Then, the conditional probability bound is:
Pr
[
H |Gm−1
]
=
p2
64k2max
fm−3
gm−1
(Bayes’s rule)
=
p
8kmax
fm−3
fm−2
(Eqn. (38))
≤ p
4kmax
.
The last inequality is due to the observation that having event Fm−3 and having PanOCS not
follow I
jm−2,∗
a ’s decision is sufficient for Fm−2.
6 Hybrid Algorithm
This section gives a 0.5016-competitive algorithm to prove Theorem 1. This is a hybrid algorithm
which combines the basic algorithm in Section 4 and the algorithm of Mehta et al. [35] (see also
Appendix A) to handle large and small bids with different strategies. For large bids, we continue
to utilize the negative correlation enabled by PanOCS. For small bids, however, we fall back to
either deterministic matches, or randomized matches with independent randomness. By doing so,
we can exploit the PanOCS for large bids (Algorithm 3, Theorem 5, and Lemma 19), and enjoy its
superior performance compared to its counterpart for general bids (Algorithm 4 and Theorem 6).
6.1 Online Primal Dual Algorithm
6.1.1 Overview
The hybrid algorithm is also an oblivious semi-randomized algorithm following the online primal
dual framework. When an impression i arrives, each advertiser a makes two offers ∆Ra βi and ∆
D
a βi.
They would be the increments of βi if i is semi-assigned or assigned to advertiser a respectively,
determined by a specific dual update rule to be explained shortly. Then, the impression i either
picks two offers of the first kind, or one offer of the second kind, whichever maximizes βi.
Recall that we call the first case a randomized round, and say that the impression is semi-
assigned to the two advertisers and the corresponding subsets given by the panoramic interval-level
assignments. In this case, we select one of the advertiser-subset combinations using the PanOCS
for large bids in Algorithm 3, which has been presented in a generalized form that accepts both
large and small bids but handle them differently. In particular, it introduces negative correlation
only among large bids.
Further recall that we call the second case a deterministic round, and say that the impression is
assigned to the advertiser and the corresponding subset by the panoramic interval-level assignments.
In sum, the hybrid algorithm, defined in Algorithm 5, is almost identical to the basic algorithm
at the high-level. However, it uses a PanOCS that handles large and small bids differently, which
in turn leads to a different dual update rule and different definitions of the offers ∆Ra βi and ∆
D
a βi.
The next subsections detail these differences.
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Algorithm 5 Hybrid Algorithm
(
Parameterized by ∆αRL(·), ∆αRR(·), ∆αDL (·), and ∆αDR (·)
)
state variables:
ka(y) ≥ 0, number of times y is semi-assigned; ka(y) =∞ if y is assigned in a deterministic round
for all impression i ∈ I do
for all advertiser a ∈ A do
computer subset Yai ⊆ [0, Ba) using panoramic interval-level assignment (Seciton 3)
compute ∆Ra βi and ∆
D
a βi according to Equations (44) and (45)
end for
find a1, a2 that maximize ∆
R
a βi, and a
∗ that maximizes ∆Da βi
if ∆Ra1βi + ∆
R
a2βi ≥ ∆Da∗βi # randomized round
assign i to what PanOCS (large bids) selects between a1 and a2 and the corresponding
subsets
else (i.e., ∆Ra1βi + ∆
R
a2βi < ∆
D
a∗βi) # deterministic round
assign i to a∗ and the corresponding subset
endif
end for
6.1.2 Primal Increments
We first introduce a lower bound of the primal objective. In the rest of the section, let γ = 0.05144
be the ratio given by Theorem 5 and its generalization stated as Lemma 19. Recall that kLa (y)
denote the number of times y is semi-assigned by large bids before it is semi-assigned by a small
bid. For any advertiser a ∈ A and any point y ∈ [0, Ba), define:
x¯a(y)
def
=

1− 2−ka(y) y ∈ [0, Ba2 ) ;
1− 2−ka(y)(1− γ)kLa (y)−1 y ∈ [Ba2 , Ba), ka(y) 6= 1 or kLa (y) 6= 0 ;
1
2 − γ4 y ∈ [Ba2 , Ba), ka(y) = 1 and kLa (y) = 0 .
By Lemma 19, for any advertiser a ∈ A and any point y ∈ [0, Ba):
xa(y) ≥ x¯a(y)
The different definitions for the first and second halves of the interval [0, Ba) differently is
motivated by the online primal dual analysis of the small-bid algorithm of Mehta et al. [35] (see
Appendix A), which also handles the two halves differently. The lower bound of the second half is
exactly the guarantee given by Lemma 19, apart from a special case when ka(y) = 1 and k
L
a (y) = 0.
The special case corresponds to when the first semi-assignment to y is a small bid. In this case, we
penalize the small bid in order to reserve sufficient primal increments for future semi-assignments
that are potentially large bids. The analysis below will substantiate this intuition. In the first half,
however, we give up the correlation given by the PanOCS. We remark that it is not an inferior
choice and can be seen as banking up primal increments for the future.
Accordingly, define a surrogate primal objective which lower bounds the actual primal:
P¯
def
=
∑
a∈A
∫ ∞
0
x¯a(y)dy .
Hence, it would suffice to show competitiveness of the algorithm w.r.t. the surrogate objective.
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Primal-increment Constants. We continue to introduce some constants for the increment in
x¯a(y) as a point y gets further assignments and semi-assignments, depending on whether they
are from large or small bids. In the following discussions, subscripts L and R represent if y is
in the left half or the right half of the interval [0, Ba). Superscripts specify the nature of the
assignments. In particular, D and R stand for deterministic assignments and randomized semi-
assignments respectively. For points in the second half of the interval, a further superscript L or S
indicates whether the assignments are from large or small bids.
We start with the simpler left half of the interval, which follows from the definition of x¯a(y).
Lemma 27. For any advertiser a ∈ A and any point y ∈ [0, Ba2 ):
• The k-th semi-assignment to advertiser a and point y increases x¯a(y) by:
∆xRL(k)
def
= 2−k .
• A deterministic assignment to advertiser a and point y after k − 1 semi-assignments
increases x¯a(y) by:
∆xDL (k)
def
= 2−k+1 .
As for the second half of the interval, the increments depend on the natural of the previous semi-
assignments. Nonetheless, we shall define history-free constants by taking the smallest increment
over all possibilities.
Lemma 28. For any advertiser a ∈ A and any y ∈ [Ba2 , Ba):
• The k-th semi-assignment to advertiser a and point y, if it is a small bid, increases x¯a(y)
by at least:
∆xRSR (k)
def
=

1
2 − γ4 k = 1 ;
2−k(1− γ)k−2 k ≥ 2 .
• The k-th semi-assignment to advertiser a and point y, if it is a large bid, increases x¯a(y)
by at least:
∆xRLR (k)
def
=

1
2 k = 1 ;
2−k(1− γ)k−2(1 + γ) k ≥ 2 .
• A deterministic assignment to advertiser a and point y after k − 1 semi-assignments
increases x¯a(y) by at least:
∆xDL (k)
def
= 2−k+1(1− γ)k−2 .
Proof. Recall the definition of x¯a(y). When y ∈ [Ba2 , Ba), it falls into the second or the third case,
which we restate below. If ka(y) 6= 1 or kLa (y) 6= 0, we call it the regular case:
x¯a(y) = 1− 2−ka(y)(1− γ)kLa (y)−1. (42)
If ka(y) = 1 and k
L
a (y) = 0, we call it special case:
x¯a(y) =
1
2
− γ
4
. (43)
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(Semi-assignment, small bid) The case of k = 1 follows by the definition in the special case,
i.e., Eqn. (43). For k ≥ 2, the expression of x¯a(y) follows the regular case in Eqn. (42), both before
and after this semi-assignment, and kLa (y) ≤ k − 1 stays the same. Hence, the increment equals:
2−k(1− γ)kLa (y)−1 ,
The minimum is achieved when kLa (y) = k − 1, and equals the ∆xRSR (k) defined in the lemma.
(Semi-assignment, large bid) First consider the binding case when all semi-assignments to y
are large bids. Then, ka(y) = k
L
a (y) holds throughout, in particular, before and after the semi-
assignment at hand. Hence, if follows from the definition of x¯a(y) that its increment equals the
∆xRLR (k) defined in the lemma.
Next, suppose there was some previous semi-assignment to y that is a small bid. If k = 2,
it corresponds to the case the first semi-assignment is a small bid and the second one is a large
bid. In other words, x¯a(y) before the large bid at hand equals
1
2 − γ4 due to the special case in its
definition. After the semi-assignment of the large bid, x¯a(y) =
3
4 by definition. The increment is
therefore 1+γ4 , which equals the ∆x
RL
R (k) for k = 2 defined in the lemma. This part crucially uses
that x¯a(y) is smaller than
1
2 in the special case, reserving part of the gain for the second round.
Finally, suppose k ≥ 3. The expression of x¯a(y) follows the regular case in Eqn. (42), both
before and after this semi-assignment, and kLa (y) stays the same. Hence, the increment equals:
2−k(1− γ)kLa (y)−1 .
Further observe that we have kLa (y) ≤ k − 2 which achieves equality only when the first k − 2
semi-assignments are all large bids and the k− 1-th semi-assignment is a small one. Therefore, the
increment is at least:
2−k(1− γ)k−3 .
This is strictly greater than the ∆xRLR (k) defined in the lemma because 1 > (1− γ)(1 + γ).
(Deterministic assignment) Observe that kLa (y) ≤ ka(y) = k − 1 before the assignment. By
the definition of x¯a(y), the increment equals:
2−k+1(1− γ)kLa (y)−1 ,
It is minimized when kLa (y) = k − 1, and equals the ∆xDR (k) defined in the lemma.
6.1.3 Invariants
The dual update rule is driven by two invariants. The first one is easy to state:
Invariant 1. Dual increment equals the primal increment defined in the previous subsection.
Next we explain another invariant that determines the value of αa(y) based on the status of
advertiser a. It is similar to Eqn. (6) in the basic algorithm yet more complicated. To begin with,
its counterpart in the basic algorithm uses only one group of parameters, while here it needs four:
• ∆αRL(k): Increment in αa(y) when y ∈ [0, Ba2 ) is semi-assigned for the k-th time.
• ∆αRR(k): Increment in αa(y) when y ∈ [Ba2 , Ba) is semi-assigned for the k-th time.
• ∆αDL (k): Increment in αa(y) when y ∈ [0, Ba2 ) is deterministically assigned if there are k − 1
semi-assignments before that.
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• ∆αDR (k): Increment in αa(y) when y ∈ [Ba2 , Ba) is deterministically assigned if there are k−1
semi-assignments before that.
These parameters will be selected in the online primal analysis by solving an LP to optimize
the competitive ratio.
Let us make a few remarks regarding the design of these parameters. First, observe that the
increment in αa(y) does not depend on whether the bid is small or large. This is intentional so that
the subsequent of arguments for approximate dual feasibility is history-free. It also means that
the costs of having small bids, which means smaller primal increments, are completely charged to
the β variables. This intuitively indicates that the algorithm is less likely to choose small bids in
randomized rounds compared to the large ones, all other things being equal.
Further, we handle the left and right halves of the interval [0, Ba) differently. Again, this is
motivated by the analysis of the small-bid algorithm, and is aligned with our definition of the primal
increments in the previous subsection.
Finally, we introduce two additional groups of parameters to model the increments in αa(y) due
to deterministic assignments. By contrast, the basic algorithm uses an ad-hoc choice of ∆αD(k) =∑∞
`=k ∆α
R(`). We bring in the additional parameters because a constraint concerning the gain of
β variables in deterministic assignments, i.e., Eqn. (12), is nonbinding in the analysis of the basic
algorithm. In other words, we could have let the β variables get less and let the α variables get
more in deterministic assignments. Although the slack is inconsequential in the basic algorithm,
the extra gain is crucial for the hybrid algorithm and its analysis.
Let kRa (y) be the number of semi-assignments to y so that we retain this information even if y
has been eventually deterministically assigned. Observe that kRa (y) = ka(y) if ka(y) <∞.
Invariant 2. For any advertiser a ∈ A and any point y ∈ [0, Ba):
αa(y) =

kRa (y)∑
`=1
∆αR(y, `) ka(y) 6=∞
kRa (y)∑
`=1
∆αR(y, `) + ∆αD(kRa (y) + 1) ka(y) =∞.
6.1.4 Dual Increments: α Variables
We further introduce notations ∆αR(y, k) and ∆αD(y, k) as follows so that subsequent integrals
are more succinct.
∆αR(y, k)
def
=
∆α
R
L(k) y ∈ [0, Ba2 ) ;
∆αRR(k) y ∈ [Ba2 , Ba) .
∆αD(y, k)
def
=
∆α
D
L (k) y ∈ [0, Ba2 ) ;
∆αDR (k) y ∈ [Ba2 , Ba) .
By the invariant regarding the α variables and the accounting by the point-level in Eqn. (2),
the dual increment of αa when an impression is semi-assigned or assigned to advertiser a and the
corresponding subset Yai are (ka(y)’s are the values before the assignment):
∆Ri αa =
∫
Yai
∆αR(y, ka(y) + 1)dy, ∆
D
i αa =
∫
Yai
∆αD(y, ka(y) + 1)dy.
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6.1.5 Dual Increments: β Variables
By the first invariant, the definition of primal increments, and the definition of dual increments in
terms of the α variables, the increments of β variables by the point-level have been pinned down:
• The k-th semi-assignment, y ∈ [0, Ba2 ):
∆βRL (k)
def
= ∆xRL(k)−∆αRL(k) .
• The k-th semi-assignment, small bid, y ∈ [Ba2 , Ba):
∆βRSR (k)
def
= ∆xRSR (k)−∆αRR(k) .
• The k-th semi-assignment, large bid, y ∈ [Ba2 , Ba):
∆βRLR (k)
def
= ∆xRLR (k)−∆αRR(k) .
• Deterministic assignment after k − 1 semi-assignments, y ∈ [0, Ba2 ):
∆βDL (k)
def
= ∆xDL (k)−∆αDL (k) .
• Deterministic assignment after k − 1 semi-assignments, y ∈ [Ba2 , Ba):
∆βDR (k)
def
= ∆xDR (k)−∆αDR (k) .
The next lemma shows that the β increments for small bids are smaller than those for large
bids. This is because the primal increments for small bids are smaller, while the increments in α
variables are the same for both small and large bids by definition.
Lemma 29. For any k ≥ 1, we have:
∆βRLL (k) ≥ ∆βRSL (k) , ∆βRLR (k) ≥ ∆βRSR (k) .
Again, we further introduce notations βRS(y, k), βRL(y, k), and βD(y, k) in order to make
integrals succinct in subsequent arguments.
∆βRL(y, k)
def
=
∆β
R
L (k) y ∈ [0, Ba2 ) ;
∆βRLR (k) y ∈ [Ba2 , Ba) .
∆βRS(y, k)
def
=
∆β
R
L (k) y ∈ [0, Ba2 ) ;
∆βRSR (j) y ∈ [Ba2 , Ba) .
∆βD(y, k)
def
=
∆β
D
L (k) y ∈ [0, Ba2 ) ;
∆βDR (j) y ∈ [Ba2 , Ba) .
Therefore, the increments of βi when i is semi-assigned or assigned to a, i.e., the offers ∆
R
a βi
and ∆Da βi in the hybrid algorithm, are defined as:
∆Ra βi
def
=

∫
Yai
∆βRL(y, ka(y) + 1)dy large bid, i.e.,
Ba
2 ≤ bai ≤ Ba ;∫
Yai
∆βRS(y, ka(y) + 1)dy small bid, i.e., 0 ≤ bai < Ba2 .
(44)
∆Da βi
def
=
∫
Yai
∆βD(y, ka(y) + 1)dy . (45)
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6.1.6 Regularity Constraints
Finally, we introduce several sets of regularity constraints on the parameters. The first two corre-
spond to the monotonicity assumption, i.e., Eqn. (14), and the superiority of randomized round,
i.e., Eqn. (11), in the basic algorithm. The last one assumes nonnegativity of the dual variables.
From now on, we shall label the constraints that will appear in the LP for optimizing the parameters
and the competitive ratio by (C1), (C2), (C3), and so on.
Monotonicity. The first set of constraints state that ∆βRL(y, k), ∆βRS(y, k) and ∆βD(y, k) are
nondecreasing w.r.t. y + k · Ba. That is, they are larger for a smaller k, and conditioned on the
same k they are larger for a smaller y’s (i.e., a point y on the left half of the interval).
∀k ≥ 1 : ∆βRLL (k) ≥ ∆βRLR (k) , ∆βRLR (k) ≥ ∆βRLL (k + 1) , (C1)
∀k ≥ 1 : ∆βRSL (k) ≥ ∆βRSR (k) , ∆βRSR (k) ≥ ∆βRSL (k + 1) , (C2)
∀k ≥ 1 : ∆βDL (k) ≥ ∆βDR (k) , ∆βDR (k) ≥ ∆βDL (k + 1) . (C3)
We state below two useful consequences of the monotonicity.
Lemma 30. The panoramic interval-level assignment chooses a subset Yai that maximizes the offers
∆Ra βi in Eqn. (44) and ∆
D
a βi in Eqn. (45).
Lemma 31. The offers ∆Ra βi in Eqn. (44) and ∆
D
a βi in Eqn. (45) as functions of impression i’s
bid bai are concave.
Superiority of Randomized Rounds. The second set of constraints implies that the algorithm
prefers randomizing over two equally good advertisers with semi-assignments, over a deterministic
assignment to only one of them.
∀k ≥ 1 : 2 ·∆βRLL (k) ≥ ∆βDL (k) , 2 ·∆βRSL (k) ≥ ∆βDL (k) ;
∀k ≥ 1 : 2 ·∆βRLR (k) ≥ ∆βDR (k) , 2 ·∆βRSR (k) ≥ ∆βDR (k) .
(C4)
Recall that the parameters satisfy that ∆βRLL (k) ≥ ∆βRSL (k) and ∆βRLR (k) ≥ ∆βRSR (k). In this
sense, listing only the inequalities for small bids would have sufficed. Nevertheless, we opt to make
it more explicit above.
As a direct corollary:
Lemma 32. For any advertiser a ∈ A and any impression i ∈ I:
∆Da βi ≤ 2 ·∆Ra βi .
Nonnegativity. We shall choose the parameters ∆αRL(·),∆αDL (·),∆αRR(·),∆αDR (·) to be nonneg-
ative. Further, we shall ensure that the corresponding β parameters are nonnegative.
∀k ≥ 1 : ∆αRL(k) ≥ 0, ∆αRR(k) ≥ 0, ∆αDL (k) ≥ 0, ∆αDR (k) ≥ 0 ; (C5)
∀k ≥ 1 : ∆βRL (k) ≥ 0, ∆βRSR (k) ≥ 0, ∆βRLR (k) ≥ 0, ∆βDL (k) ≥ 0, ∆βDR (k) ≥ 0 . (C6)
Lemma 33. For any advertiser a ∈ A and any impression i, αa ≥ 0 and βi ≥ 0.
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6.2 Online Primal Dual Analysis
In this section, we let the competitive ratio Γ also be a parameter to be optimized together with
the other ones in the analysis. Next, we derive a set of sufficient conditions for proving that the
hybrid algorithm is Γ-competitive.
Reverse Weak Duality. This holds for any choice of the parameters by the design of the primal
dual algorithm. In particular, we ensure the invariant that dual increment equals the lower bound
of the surrogate primal increment given in Lemma 27 and Lemma 28. Therefore, we have P¯ ≥ D.
Recall that the surrogate primal objective lower bounds the actual one, i.e., P ≥ P¯ , we get reverse
weak duality.
Approximate Dual Feasibility. Fix any advertiser a, and an impression set S. We restate
approximate dual feasibility below, where the contribution of αa is accounted by the point-level:∫ Ba
0
αa(y)dy +
∑
i∈S
βi ≥ Γ · ba(S). . (46)
Next, we will explain how to lower bound the α and β variables respectively, and will show a
charging scheme that distributes the lower bounds of the β variables to the points y ∈ [0, Ba). These
are similar to their counterparts in the basic algorithm. Unlike the basic algorithm, however, here
the lower bound distributed to each point may not be at least Γ on its own. We will demonstrate
how to prove Eqn. (46) by constructing an appropriate measure preserving mapping between points
in the left half and those in the right half of the interval [0, Ba), such that the lower bound charged
to each pair is at least 2Γ.
6.2.1 Lower Bound of αa
By the definition of the α-invariant, the gain from αa(y) depends on ka(y) and k
R
a (y). To simplify
the case, we impose further constraints below:
∀k ≥ 1 : ∆αRL(k) ≤ ∆αDL (k)− αDL (k + 1) , (C7)
∀k ≥ 1 : ∆αRR(k) ≤ ∆αDR (k)− αDR (k + 1) . (C8)
They imply that for any point y with ka(y) = ∞, the larger kRa (·) is, the small αa(y) is by
the α-invariant. How large could kRa (·) be? For this, recall the property of ka(·) from Lemma 4.
It states that other than the subsets that have been deterministically assigned, the value of ka(y)
equals k˜a(y) defined as:
k˜a(y)
def
=
{
kmin + 1 y < y
∗ ;
kmin y ≥ y∗ .
Here, recall that kmin = minz∈[0,Ba) ka(z), and y
∗ denote the start point of the next subset in
the panoramic interval-level assignment.
Then, the largest possible value of kRa (y) is k˜a(y) − 1 because at least the last time must be
reserved for the deterministic assignment. Further recall that YD denote the subset of of points in
[0, Ba) that are deterministically assigned:
YD
def
=
{
y ∈ [0, Ba) : y is deterministically assigned by the end of the algorithm
}
.
We have the following lower bound of the α variables.
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Lemma 34. For any advertiser a ∈ A and any point y ∈ [0, Ba), we have:
αa(y) ≥

k˜a(y)∑
`=1
∆αR(y, `) y /∈ YD ;
k˜a(y)−1∑
`=1
∆αR(y, `) + ∆αD(y, k˜a(y)) y ∈ YD .
In fact, the former case always holds with equality, although this observation is unimportant
for our analysis.
6.2.2 Lower Bounds of β Variables and Charging to Points
We now turn to the lower bound of βi for impressions i ∈ S. Similar to the analysis of the basic
algorithm in Section 4, it depends on the matching status of impression i, in particular, whether i
is semi-assigned or assigned to advertiser a and whether it is a deterministic or randomized round.
Recall the definitions of sets N and R from the analysis of the basic algorithm:
N
def
=
{
i ∈ S : i is neither assigned nor semi-assigned to a} ,
R
def
=
{
i ∈ S : i is semi-assigned to a} .
Further define the sum of the bids in these subsets as bN and bR respectively for future reference:
bN
def
=
∑
i∈N
bai , bR
def
=
∑
i∈R
bai .
We will find two subset YN , YR ⊆ [0, Ba), and will distribute the lower bounds of βi’s, i ∈ N
and i ∈ R, to the points y ∈ YN and y ∈ YR respectively. More precisely, we shall define β(y)’s
such that:
• YN , YR, and YD are disjoint.
• YN , YR, and YD have total measure at least ba(S), i.e.:
µ(YN ) + µ(YR) + µ(YD) ≥ ba(S) . (47)
• The β(y)’s lower bound the βi’s, i.e.:∑
i∈N
βi ≥
∫
YN
β(y)dy ; (48)
∑
i∈R
βi ≥
∫
YR
β(y)dy . (49)
Construction of YN and the Corresponding β(y)’s. Consider the impressions i ∈ N . There
are two different cases depending on whether i is a deterministic or randomized round. We claim
that in both cases:
βi ≥ 2 ·∆Ra βi .
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Suppose it is a deterministic round. Since i chooses advertiser a∗ deterministically instead of
randomizing between advertisers a∗ and a, βi = ∆Da∗βi ≥ ∆Ra∗βi + ∆Ra βi. Further by Lemma 32,
∆Da∗βi ≤ 2∆Ra∗βi. Cancelling ∆Ra∗βi by combining the two inequalities leads to βi = ∆Da∗βi ≥ 2∆Ra βi.
Suppose it is a randomized round. By definition, both candidates in this round offer at least
∆Ra βi, or else the algorithm would have chosen advertiser a instead. Hence, βi ≥ 2∆Ra βi.
Next, express ∆Ra βi in terms of the state variables using the definition of ∆
R
a βi in Eqn. (44).
Recall that kia(y)’s denote the values of the state variables when impression i arrives, and Yai
denotes the subset by the panoramic interval-level assignment, should i be semi-assigned or assigned
to advertiser a when it arrives. If bai is a small:
βi ≥ 2 ·
∫
Yai
∆βRS(kia(y) + 1)dy . (50)
If bai is large:
βi ≥ 2 ·
∫
Yai
∆βRL(kia(y) + 1)dy . (51)
We need to further derive a lower bound w.r.t. the state variables ka(y)’s at the end of the
algorithm. Its proof is almost verbatim to its counterpart in the basic algorithm, i.e., Lemma 35.
We include it for completeness.
Lemma 35. For any subset Y˜ai with measure at most bai, we have:∫
Yai
∆βRS(kia(y) + 1)dy ≥
∫
Y˜ai
∆βRS(ka(y) + 1)dy ,∫
Yai
∆βRL(kia(y) + 1)dy ≥
∫
Y˜ai
∆βRL(ka(y) + 1)dy .
Proof. Since the panoramic interval-level assignment chooses a subset Yai of measure bai with the
minimum kia(y)’s, i.e., Lemma 30, by the monotonicity of ∆β
RS(·) and ∆βRL(·) in Eqn. (C1) and
Eqn. (C2), we have: ∫
Yai
∆βRS(kia(y) + 1)dy ≥
∫
Y˜ai
∆βRS(kia(y) + 1)dy ,∫
Yai
∆βRL(kia(y) + 1)dy ≥
∫
Y˜ai
∆βRL(kia(y) + 1)dy .
Further observe that ka(y) ≥ kia(y) for any y ∈ [0, Ba). Applying the monotonicity of ∆βRS(·)
and ∆βRL(·) once again proves the lemma.
Next, define YN as:
YN
def
=
[
y∗, y∗ ⊕YD bN
)
. (52)
Here, recall that [y, y ⊕Y b) denotes a subset of [0, Ba) with measure b, obtained by scanning
through the interval starting from y and exluding the points in Y .
The values of β(y)’s are determined by two possible lower bounds ΨNL and ΨNS for
∑
i∈N βi,
which we explain below. The first one corresponds to when there is a single large impression i ∈ N
with bid bai = bN . The second one corresponds to when there are one or two small impressions
i ∈ N whose bids sum to bN , and in case of two impressions, one of them has the largest possible
small bid, i.e., Ba2 .
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Formally, define the first lower bound as:
ΨNL
def
= 2 ·
∫
YN
∆βRL(y, ka(y) + 1)dy .
To define the second lower bound, let bN1 = min{Ba/2, BN} and further define:
YN1 =
[
y∗, y∗ ⊕YD bN1
) \ YD,
YN2 =
[
y∗ ⊕YD bN1, y∗ ⊕YD bN
) \ YD.
Observe that YN2 = YN \ YN1 by definition. The second lower bound is then defined as:
ΨNS
def
= 2
∫
YN1
∆βRS
(
y, ka(y) + 1
)
dy + 2
∫
YN2
∆βRS
(
y 	YD Ba2 , ka(y 	YD Ba2 ) + 1
)
dy .
An explanation for the design of y in the second integral is due. This part is relevant only when
bN >
Ba
2 . That is, we consider two small bids: the first is
B
2 and the second is bN − Ba2 . Here,
mapping y to y	YD Ba2 is a measure preserving map from YN2 to the first bN − Ba2 measure of YN1.
By doing so, we explicitly use the fact that the second small bid’s βi can be lower bounded using
a subset starting from y∗ in Lemma 35, even though the lower bound is eventually charged to YN2
which does not start from y∗.
By the monotonicity of parameters ∆βRSL (·) and ∆βRSR (·), i.e., Eqn. (C2), this is strictly better
than the trivial bound without the mapping of y, which we used in the analysis of the basic
algorithm. This is the main power of small bids, which pays for the penalties they had
in the dual update rule.
The values of β(y)’s are set according to the smaller of the two lower bounds:
β(y)
def
=

2 ·∆βRL(y, ka(y) + 1) ΨNL < ΨNS ;
2 ·∆βRS(y, ka(y) + 1) ΨNL ≥ ΨNS , y ∈ YN1 ;
2 ·∆βRS(y 	YD Ba2 , ka(y 	YD Ba2 ) + 1) ΨNL ≥ ΨNS , y ∈ YN2 .
(53)
Finally, we prove that the smaller of the two indeed lower bounds
∑
i∈N βi.
Proof of Eqn. (48). We restate the inequality below:∑
i∈N
βi ≥
∫
YN
β(y) = 2 ·min{ΨNL, ΨNS} .
Let ΦNS(b), 0 ≤ b ≤ Ba2 , denote the offer from advertiser a for a small bid b at the final state
of the algorithm. Observe that it would be semi-assigned to [y∗, y∗ ⊕YD b) \ YD. We have:
ΦNS(b)
def
=
∫
[y∗,y∗⊕YD b)\YD
∆βRS
(
y, ka(y) + 1
)
dy .
Similarly, ΦNL(b), Ba2 < b ≤ Ba, denote the offer from advertiser a for a large bid b at the final
state of the algorithm:
ΦNL(b)
def
=
∫
[y∗,y∗⊕YD b)\YD
∆βRL
(
y, ka(y) + 1
)
dy .
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For any impression i ∈ N , letting Y˜ai = [y∗, y∗ ⊕YD bai) in Lemma 35, we have:∫
Yai
∆βRS(y, kia(y) + 1)dy ≥ ΦNS(bai) ,∫
Yai
∆βRL(y, kia(y) + 1)dy ≥ ΦNL(bai) .
(54)
Recall that the LHS of the above inequalities are half the lower bound of βi for small and large
bids respectively, due to Eqn. (50) and Eqn. (51). In other words, we lower bound each βi by what
advertiser a would have offered if impression i arrived at the end.
The rest of the proof further transforms the sum of these lower bounds for βi for i ∈ N into
the stated bound in the lemma. First we may asssume wlog that bN ≤ Ba− µ(YD). Otherwise, we
could have decrease the bid of some impressions in N such that the LHS of Eqn. (48) decreases,
while the RHS stays the same.
Further, it is wlog to merge small bids into at most two; in the case of two small bids, it is wlog
that the larger one has size Ba2 . This is because Φ
NS(·) is concave by By Lemma 31. Formally, for
any two small bids b ≥ b′ and any δ, concavity implies:
ΦNS(b) + ΦNS(b′) ≥ ΦNS(b+ δ) + ΦNS(b′ − δ) .
Then, we may let δ = b′ if b + b′ ≤ Ba2 , and let δ = Ba2 − b otherwise. Repeating this operation
proves the claim.
Finally, we claim that it is wlog to assume having either only small bids, or a single large bid.
Observe that there can be at most one large bid by defintion. In the presence of both large and
small bids, and after the aforementioned merging of small bids, it must be the case that we have
one large bid, say b > Ba2 , and one small bid b
′ ≤ Ba2 .
Since both ΦNS(·) and ΦNL(·) are concave by Lemma 31, we either have:
ΦNL(b) + ΦNS(b′) ≥ ΦNL(b+ δ) + ΦNS(b′ − δ) ,
for any 0 ≤ δ ≤ b′, or:
ΦNL(b) + ΦNS(b′) ≥ ΦNL(b− δ) + ΦNS(b′ + δ) ,
for any 0 ≤ δ ≤ b − Ba2 . The range of δ in the second case is chosen such that the large bid does
not become small. Observe that the small bid can not become large without letting the large bid
become small since they sum to at most Ba.
In the former case, we let δ = b′ to eliminate the small impression.
In the latter case, we let δ = b− Ba2 . Then, the claim follows by the observation that conditioned
on having the same size Ba2 , downgrading the large bid into a small bid leads to a smaller offer and
thus, a smaller lower bound for the corresponding βi. The observation follows by the definition of β
increment in Eqn. (53), and the comparison of β increments for large and small bids in Lemma 29.
Reading Guide. The remaining parts of the subsection, including the construction of YR and the
correponsding β(y)’s, the disjointness of YN , YR, and YD, and their measure bounds, are almost
verbatim to the counterparts in the basic algorithm. We include them below for completeness.
Nonetheless, readers may want to skip to the next subsection.
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Construction of YR and the Corresponding β(y)’s. Since the algorithm does not choose
matching to advertiser a deterministically, βi ≥ ∆Da βi. By the definition of ∆Da βi in Eqn. (45):
βi ≥
∫
YR
∆βD(y, kia(y)). (55)
We need to further derive a lower bound w.r.t. the ka(y)’s at the end of the algorithm. The
next lemma is similar to Lemma 35 in the previous case, but more generally considers arbitrary
kˆa(y) ≥ kia(y) instead of only the ka(y) at the end of the algorithm.
Lemma 36. Consider any kˆa(y)’s such that kˆa(y) ≥ kia(y) for any y ∈ [0, Ba). Then, for any
subset Y˜ai with measure at most bai:∫
Yai
∆βD(y, kia(y) + 1)dy ≥
∫
Y˜ai
∆βD(y, kˆa(y) + 1)dy .
Proof. Since the panoramic interval-level assignment chooses a subset Yai of measure bai with the
minimum and left most kia(y)’s, combining with the monotonicity of ∆β
D in Eqn. (C3):∫
Yai
∆βD(y, kia(y) + 1)dy ≥
∫
Y˜ai
∆βD(y, kia(y) + 1)dy .
The lemma then follows by the assumption that kˆa(y) ≥ kia(y) for any y ∈ [0, Ba), and by the
monotonicity of ∆βD in Eqn. (C3).
For any i ∈ R, define Y˜ai as:
Y˜ai =
[
y∗ 	YD
∑
i′∈R : i′≥i
bai′ , y
∗ 	YD
∑
i′∈R : i′>i
bai′
)
\ YD . (56)
In other words, we scan backwards through the interval [0, Ba) starting from y
∗, treating the
interval as a circle by gluing its endpoints. Then, we construct Y˜ai’s for i ∈ R one at a time by
their arrival order from latest to earliest, letting each be a subset excluding YD with measure up to
bai. If
∑
i∈N bai ≤ Ba−µ(YD), which we consider the canonical case, these would be the panoramic
interval-level assignments if these i ∈ R arrived at the end of the instance, assuming the same final
state of the algorithm. By the definition of the boundary case, we stop scanning through [0, Ba)
after a full circle; therefore, the above Y˜ai’s are disjoint.
Define YR and the corresponding β(y) as:
YR
def
=
⋃
i∈R
Y˜ai \ YN ,
∀y ∈ YR : β(y) def= ∆βD(y, ka(y)) .
(57)
We remark that YR can be simplified as YR = [y
∗ 	YD bR, y∗) \ YD if bR + bN + µ(YD) ≤ Ba,
which we consider the canonical case of the analysis.
Proof of Eqn. (49). We restate the inequality below:∑
i∈R
βi ≥
∫
YR
β(y)dy =
∫
YR
∆βD(y, ka(y))dy .
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For any i ∈ R, define k−ia (y) by considering what the state variables of advertiser a would have
been before the arrival of i if the impressions in R were the latest ones in the instance. More
precisely, for any i ∈ R, let:
k−ia (y)
def
=
{
ka(y)− 1 y ∈
[
y∗ 	YD
∑
i′∈R : i′≥i bai′ , y
∗) \ YD ;
ka(y) otherwise.
Intuitively, these are the largest possible values of kia(y)’s. We restate Lemma 12 below, which
still holds in the hybrid algorithm with a verbatim proof.
Lemma 37. For any i ∈ R and any y ∈ [0, Ba):
k−ia (y) ≥ kia(y) .
Consider any i ∈ R. By definition, Y˜ai is a subset with measure at most bai. Further, Lemma 37
above allows us to apply Lemma 36, which by the monotonicity of ∆βD(·) in Eqn. (C3) gives:∫
Yai
∆βD(y, kia(y) + 1) ≥
∫
Y˜ai
∆βD(y, k−ia (y) + 1)dy .
Finally, by k−ia (y) = ka(y)− 1 for any y ∈ Y˜ai:∫
Yai
∆βD(y, kia(y) + 1)dy ≥
∫
Y˜ai
∆βD(y, ka(y))dy . (58)
Eqn. (49) then follows by Eqn. (55), the above inequality in Eqn. (58), and the definition of YR
and the correposnding β(y) for y ∈ YR in Eqn. (57), through a sequence of inequalities as follows:∑
i∈R
βi ≥
∑
i∈R
∫
Yai
∆βD(y, kia(y) + 1)dy (Eqn. (55))
≥
∑
i∈R
∫
Y˜ai
∆βD(y, ka(y))dy (Eqn. (58))
≥
∫
YR
β(y)dy . (Eqn. (57))
Disjointness. The sets YN and YR can be written as:
YN =
[
y∗, y∗ ⊕YD bN
) \ YD , YR = [y∗ 	YD bR, y∗) \ (YD ∪ YN ) .
Hence, they are disjoint by definition.
Measure Bound. If bN+bR+µ(YD) > Ba, the union of YD,
[
y∗, y∗⊕YD bN
)
, and
[
y∗	YD bR, y∗
)
covers [0, Ba). Further by the above equivalent forms of YN and YR, the union of YN , YR, and YD
also covers [0, Ba). Then, the measure bound follows by:
µ(YN ) + µ(YR) + µ(YD) ≥ Ba ≥ ba(S) .
Otherwise, YR simplifies as
[
y∗ 	YD bR, y∗
) \ YD. We have:
µ(YN ) = bN =
∑
i∈R
bai , µ(YR) = bR =
∑
i∈R
bai .
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Further, any impression i ∈ S that is not in N or R must be deterministically assigned. Hence:
µ(YD) ≥
∑
i∈S\(N∪R)
bai .
Together we have:
µ(YR) + µ(YN ) + µ(YD) ≥
∑
i∈S
bai ≥ ba(S) .
6.2.3 Amortization: Pairing Points Between Left and Right
Let us summarize the lower bound from αa(y) and β(y) by the point-level below.
• If y ∈ YN (large bid subcase), by Lemma 34 and Eqn. (53), αa(y) + β(y) is at least:
ψNLL
(
k˜a(y)
) def
=
∑k˜a(y)
`=1 ∆α
R
L(`) + 2 ·∆βRLL
(
k˜a(y) + 1
)
0 ≤ y < Ba2 ;
ψNLR
(
k˜a(y)
) def
=
∑k˜a(y)
`=1 ∆α
R
R(`) + 2 ·∆βRLR
(
k˜a(y) + 1
)
Ba
2 ≤ y < Ba .
• If y ∈ YN and further y ∈ YN1 (small bid subcase, first small bid), by Lemma 34 and Eqn. (53),
αa(y) + β(y) is at least:
ψNS1L
(
k˜a(y)
) def
=
∑k˜a(y)
`=1 ∆α
R
L(`) + 2 ·∆βRSL
(
k˜a(y) + 1
)
0 ≤ y < Ba2 ;
ψNS1R
(
k˜a(y)
) def
=
∑k˜a(y)
`=1 ∆α
R
R(`) + 2 ·∆βRSR
(
k˜a(y) + 1
)
Ba
2 ≤ y < Ba .
• If y ∈ YN and further y ∈ YN2 (small bid subcase, second small bid), by Lemma 34 and
Eqn. (53), αa(y) + β(y) is at least:
∑k˜a(y)
`=1 ∆α
R
L(`) + 2 ·∆βRS
(
y 	YD Ba2 , k˜a(y 	YD Ba2 ) + 1
)
0 ≤ y < Ba2 ;∑k˜a(y)
`=1 ∆α
R
R(`) + 2 ·∆βRS
(
y 	YD Ba2 , k˜a(y 	YD Ba2 ) + 1
)
Ba
2 ≤ y < Ba .
This case is more involved since it is unclear whether point y 	YD Ba2 is on the left or the
right. If point y is on the left half, i.e., y < Ba2 , both y
∗ and y 	YD Ba2 are on the right of y.
Hence, k˜a(y 	YD Ba2 ) ≤ k˜a(y)− 1. By the monotonicity of ∆βRS(y, k):
αa(y) + β(y) ≥ ψNS2L
(
k˜a(y)
) def
=
k˜a(y)∑
`=1
∆αRL(`) + 2 ·∆βRSR
(
k˜a(y)
)
0 ≤ y < Ba
2
.
Next suppose point y is on the right half, i.e., Ba2 ≤ y < Ba. If point y 	YD Ba2 is on the left
half, k˜a(y 	YD Ba2 ) ≤ k˜a(y) and β(y) ≥ 2∆βRSL (k˜a(y) + 1). Otherwise, i.e., point y 	YD Ba2 is
on the right, k˜a(y 	YD Ba2 ) ≤ k˜a(y)− 1, and β(y) ≥ 2∆βRSR (k˜a(y)), which is even larger than
the previous case by the monotonicity of ∆βRS(y, k). In sum:
αa(y) + β(y) ≥ ψNS2R
(
k˜a(y)
) def
=
k˜a(y)∑
`=1
∆αRR(`) + 2 ·∆βRSL
(
k˜a(y) + 1
) Ba
2
≤ y < Ba .
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• If y ∈ YR, by Lemma 34 and Eqn. (57), αa(y) + β(y) is at least:
ψRL
(
k˜a(y)
) def
=
∑k˜a(y)
`=1 ∆α
R
L(`) + ∆β
D
L (k˜a(y)) 0 ≤ y < Ba2 ;
ψRR
(
k˜a(y)
) def
=
∑k˜a(y)
`=1 ∆α
R
R(`) + ∆β
D
R (k˜a(y))
Ba
2 ≤ y < Ba .
• If y ∈ YD, by Lemma 34 and define β(y) = 0, αa(y) + β(y) is at least:
ψDL
(
k˜a(y)
) def
=
∑k˜a(y)−1
`=1 ∆α
R
L(`) + ∆α
D
L
(
k˜a(y)
)
0 ≤ y < Ba2 ;
ψDR
(
k˜a(y)
) def
=
∑k˜a(y)−1
`=1 ∆α
R
R(`) + ∆α
D
R
(
k˜a(y)
)
Ba
2 ≤ y < Ba .
Approximate Dual Feasibility Fails Locally. In the previous analysis of the basic algorithm,
approximate dual feasibility holds locally in that αa(y) + β(y) ≥ Γ for any y ∈ YN ∪ YR ∪ YD. If
we follow the same strategy, the above functions from ψNLL (k) to ψ
D
R (k) need to be at least Γ for
all possible values of k = k˜a(y). This is impossible, however, for any nontrivial competitive ratio
Γ > 0.5. This shall not be surprising since it goes against the strategy of handling the left and
right halves of the interval [0, Ba) differently in the hybrid algorithm.
New Plan: Pairing Points Between Left and Right. Based on the above discussion, an
amortization between left and right is needed. Concretely, we will design a measure preserving
map h : [0, Ba2 ) 7→ [Ba2 , Ba) such that:
∀y ∈
[
0,
Ba
2
)
, αa(y) + β(y) + αa(h(y)) + β(h(y)) ≥ 2Γ . (59)
This would be sufficient for approximate dual feasibility if the union of YN , YR, and YD covers
[0, Ba). To make the above pairing idea works in the general case, we further impose the following
constraint on the increments in β variables:
∆βRSL (1) ≤
Γ
2
. (C9)
Lemma 38. Eqn. (59) implies approximate dual feasibility.
Proof. First consider the case when the union of YN , YR, and YD covers [0, Ba).∫ Ba
0
αa(y) dy +
∑
i∈S
βi ≥
∫ Ba
0
αa(y) dy +
∫
YN∪YN∪YD
β(y) dy (Eqn. (48) and (49))
=
∫ Ba
0
(
αa(y) + β(y)
)
dy
=
∫ Ba
2
0
(
αa(y) + β(y) + αa(h(y)) + β(h(y))
)
dy (h is measure preserving)
≥
∫ Ba
2
0
2Γ dy = Γ ·Ba . (Eqn. (59))
Next, consider an instance in which this does not hold, i.e.:∑
i∈S
bai ≤ µ(YN ∪ YR ∪ YD) < Ba .
49
Suppose we add to S a set of impressions that are small bids w.r.t. advertiser a to S summing
to Ba −
∑
i∈S bai. Then, the RHS of approximate dual feasibility increases by Γ · (Ba −
∑
i∈S bai),
while the LHS increases by at most this amount due to Eqn. (C9) and the monotonicity of ∆βRSL (·)
and ∆βRSR (·) in Eqn. (C2). In other words, the new impressions make approximate dual feasibility
harder to satisfy, and prove the lemma by reducing it to the case when the union of YN , YR, and
YD covers [0, Ba).
Na¨ıve Measure Preserving Map. Consider a trivial measure preserving map h(y) = y + Ba2 .
By the property of ka(·) in Lemma 4, there are two possible combinations of k˜a(y) and k˜a(h(y)):
• k˜a(y) = kmin + 1 and k˜a(h(y)) = kmin; or
• k˜a(y) = kmin and k˜a(h(y)) = kmin.
Moreover, we can rule out an impossible case by the policy of interval-level assignment.
Lemma 39 (Impossible Case). For any point y on the left half, and any point h(y) on the right
half, it is impossible that y ∈ N and k˜a(y) = kmin + 1, while h(y) ∈ R and k˜a(h(y)) = kmin.
Proof. Suppose for contrary that there are such points y and h(y). By y ∈ N , we have [y∗, y) ⊆ YN .
Further by k˜a(y) = k
min
a + 1, it follows from Lemma 4 that y < y
∗. Hence, by the panoramic
treatment of the notation for intervals:
[y∗, y) = [0, y) ∪ [y∗, Ba) ⊆ YN .
Similarly, by h(y) ∈ YR, we have [h(y), y∗) ⊆ YR. Further by k˜a(h(y)) = kmina , it follows from
Lemma 4 that h(y) ≥ y∗. Hence, by the panoramic treatment of notation:
[h(y), y∗) = [0, y∗) ∪ [h(y), Ba) ⊆ YR .
Together we conclude that YN ∩ YR is not empty, contradicting their construction.
Table 1 summarizes the worst-case bound for the LHS of Eqn. (59). Here, whenever y, or h(y),
or both belong to YN , we use the worst-case bound when they are in the small-bid subcase, and
when y, h(y) ∈ YN1. This is indeed the main drawback of the trivial mapping since we cannot
exploit the extra gain from the YN2 case of small bids. As a result, these constraints are still too
restricted to get any competitive better than 0.5.
Our Measure Preserving Map. Next, we design a better mapping to improve the cases when
y, h(y) ∈ YN . In particular, we shall rule out the case when both of them are in YN1, i.e., the
top-left cells in Table 2. Intuitively, this is possible because the total measure of YN1 is at most
Ba
2 . Concretely, we construct the measure-preserving map h in four steps as follows:
1. For any y ∈ [0, Ba2 ) such that y ∈ YN2 (which means y	YD Ba2 ∈ YN1), and y	YD Ba2 ∈ [Ba2 , Ba),
map y to h(y)
def
= y 	YD Ba2 .
2. For any y ∈ [0, Ba2 ) such that y⊕YD Ba2 ∈ YN2 (which means y ∈ YN1), and y⊕YD Ba2 ∈ [Ba2 , Ba),
map y to h(y)
def
= y ⊕YD Ba/2.
These two steps consider pairs of points y1 ∈ YN1 and y2 = y1 ⊕YD Ba2 ∈ YN2 such that there is
one of the left half and one on the right half. The measure-preserving map h then maps the former
to the latter. We show an example in Figure 4.
50
YN , k YR, k YD, k
YN , k ψ
NS1
L (k) + ψ
NS1
R (k) ψ
NS1
L (k) + ψ
R
R(k) ψ
NS1
L (k) + ψ
D
R (k)
YN , k + 1 ψ
NS1
L (k + 1) + ψ
NS1
R (k) (impossible) ψ
NS1
L (k + 1) + ψ
D
R (k)
YR, k ψ
R
L (k) + ψ
NS1
R (k) ψ
R
L (k) + ψ
R
R(k) ψ
R
L (k) + ψ
D
R (k)
YR, k + 1 ψ
R
L (k + 1) + ψ
NS1
R (k) ψ
R
L (k + 1) + ψ
R
R(k) ψ
R
L (k + 1) + ψ
D
R (k)
YD, k ψ
D
L (k) + ψ
NS1
R (k) ψ
D
L (k) + ψ
R
R(k) ψ
D
L (k) + ψ
D
R (k)
YD, k + 1 ψ
D
L (k + 1) + ψ
NS1
R (k) ψ
D
L (k + 1) + ψ
R
R(k) ψ
D
L (k + 1) + ψ
D
R (k)
Table 1: Approximate dual feasibility constraints with the na¨ıve map h(y) = y + Ba2 . Rows are
combinations of y’s type and k˜a(y). Columns are combinations of h(y)’s type and k˜a(h(y)). Write
k˜a(h(y)) as k for brevity. The range is k ≥ 1; the first, second, fourth, and sixth cells in the first
column further include k = 0. This is because y 6∈ YR ∪ YD when k˜a(y) = 0 and h(y) 6∈ YR ∪ YD
when k˜a(h(y)) = 0. Each formula in the table shall be at least 2Γ.
3. For the points y ∈ [0, Ba2 ) and y ∈ YN1 whose map h(y) remains undefined after the first two
steps, map to the unmapped points in [Ba2 , Ba)\YN1 in an arbitrary measure-preserving way.
The third step ensures that the points in YN1 are not mapped with each other. Why is this
possible? Suppose a measure of µ0 has been mapped from each half of the interval [0, Ba) in the first
two steps. Recall that the first two steps only define a mapping between YN1-YN2 pairs. Further
by the observation that YN1 has measure at most
Ba
2 , the total measure of the unmapped points in
YN1 is at most
Ba
2 − µ0.4 Suppose µL of these measure are on the left half. Then, YN1 has a total
measure of at most Ba2 − µ0 − µL on the right. Finally, since the unmapped measure on the right
half is precisely Ba2 − µ0, we conclude that the unmapped measure on the right half excluding YN1
is at least (Ba2 − µ0)− (Ba2 − µ0 − µL) = µL.
4. For the points y ∈ [0, Ba2 ) whose map h(y) is still undefined, map to the unmapped points in
[Ba2 , Ba) in an arbitrary measure-preserving way.
Next, we present the main property of the above measure-preserving map h.
Lemma 40 (Refined YN -YN Small-bid Cases). Suppose y and h(y) are both in YN in the small-bid
subcase. Then, it must be one of the following cases:
• y ∈ YN1 with k˜a(y) = kmina and h(y) ∈ YN2 with k˜a(h(y)) = kmina .
• y ∈ YN1 with k˜a(y) = kmina + 1 and h(y) ∈ YN2 with k˜a(h(y)) = kmina + 1.
• y ∈ YN2 with k˜a(y) = kmina + 1 and h(y) ∈ YN1 with k˜a(h(y)) = kmina .
Proof. By definition, two points in YN1 can not be matched. Further, if YN2 is nonempty then
YN1 must have measure
Ba
2 . Hence, any measure-preserving map that does not map points in YN1
to each other must not map points outside YN1 to each other. In other words, two points in YN2
cannot be matched. Hence, we have one of y and h(y) in YN1 and the other in YN2.
4It holds with equality in the case of two small bids, and with strict inequality in the case of only one small bid
strictly smaller than Ba
2
.
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Figure 4: Example: map y to h(y). (µ(YN1) = Ba/2)
Suppose y ∈ YN1 and h(y) ∈ YN2. By definition, [y, h(y)) \ YD ⊆ YN , which does not contain
y∗ in it. In other words, y < Ba2 ≤ h(y) must be on the same side of y∗. Then, by Lemma 4 either
k˜a(y) = k˜a(h(y)) = k
min
a , which happens if they are both on the right of y
∗, or k˜a(y) = k˜a(h(y)) =
kmina + 1, which happens if they are both on the left of y
∗.
Next suppose y ∈ YN2 and h(y) ∈ YN1. Similarly, by definition [h(y), y) ⊆ YN , which does not
contain y∗ in it. Here recall the panoramic treatment of notation. By y < Ba2 ≤ h(y) we further
conclude [h(y), y) = [0, y) ∪ [h(y), Ba) ⊆ YN . In other words, y is on the left of y∗ and h(y) is on
the right of y∗. Then, by Lemma 4, k˜a(y) = kmina + 1 and k˜a(h(y)) = kmina .
Hence, for the top-left cells in the table which concern the cases when both y and h(y) are
in YN , it suffices to consider the large-bid subcase and the small-bid subcase stated in the above
lemma. We formulate the refined constraints in Table 2.
6.3 Optimizing the Parameters: Proof of Theorem 1
Finally, to avoid having an infinite number of parameters and constraints, we set all parameters,
including ∆αRL(k), ∆α
R
R(k), ∆α
D
L (k), ∆α
D
L (k), ∆β
RL
L (k), ∆β
RL
R (k), ∆β
RS
L (k), ∆β
RS
R (k), ∆β
D
L (k),
and ∆βDR (k), to be 0 when k > kmax for some sufficiently large integer kmax. Doing so does
not violate the regularity constraints, including the monotonicity constraints in Equations (C1),
(C2), and (C3), the superiority of randomized rounds in Eqn. (C4), and the nonnegativity in
Equations (C5) and (C6), so long as nonzero parameters for 1 ≤ k ≤ kmax satisfy them. Further,
the same applies to the constraints for simplifying the lower bounds of α variables in Equations (C7)
and (C8). Further, the simplifying constraint in Eqn. (C9), which allows us to prove approximate
dual feasibility by pairing points between left and right, does not consider large k and thus, is
unaffected. Finally, the approximate feasibility constraints in Table 2 for k > kmax simplifies to a
single boundary constraint as follows:
kmax∑
k=1
(
∆αRL(k) + ∆α
R
R(k)
) ≥ 2Γ . (C10)
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YN , k YR, k YD, k
YN , k
ψNS1L (k) + ψ
NS2
R (k) ,
ψNLL (k) + ψ
NL
R (k)
ψNS1L (k) + ψ
R
R(k) ψ
NS1
L (k) + ψ
D
R (k)
YN , k + 1
ψNS2L (k + 1) + ψ
NS1
R (k) ,
ψNLL (k + 1) + ψ
NL
R (k)
(impossible) ψNS1L (k + 1) + ψ
D
R (k)
YR, k ψ
R
L (k) + ψ
NS1
R (k) ψ
R
L (k) + ψ
R
R(k) ψ
R
L (k) + ψ
D
R (k)
YR, k + 1 ψ
R
L (k + 1) + ψ
NS1
R (k) ψ
R
L (k + 1) + ψ
R
R(k) ψ
R
L (k + 1) + ψ
D
R (k)
YD, k ψ
D
L (k) + ψ
NS1
R (k) ψ
D
L (k) + ψ
R
R(k) ψ
D
L (k) + ψ
D
R (k)
YD, k + 1 ψ
D
L (k + 1) + ψ
NS1
R (k) ψ
D
L (k + 1) + ψ
R
R(k) ψ
D
L (k + 1) + ψ
D
R (k)
Table 2: Approximate dual feasibility constraints with our measure preserving map. Rows are
combinations of y’s type and k˜a(y). Columns are combinations of h(y)’s type and k˜a(h(y)). Write
k˜a(h(y)) as k for brevity. The range is k ≥ 1; the first, second, fourth, and sixth cells in the first
column further include k = 0. This is because y 6∈ YR ∪ YD when k˜a(y) = 0 and h(y) 6∈ YR ∪ YD
when k˜a(h(y)) = 0. Each formula in the table shall be at least 2Γ.
The finite LP has O(kmax) constraints and is formulated below:
maximize Γ
subject to Regularity Constraints (C1) (C2) (C3) (C4)(C5) (C6) 1 ≤ k ≤ kmax
Simplifying Constraints (C7) (C8) 1 ≤ k ≤ kmax
Simplifying Constraint (C9)
Approximate Dual Feasibility Constraints in Table 2 0 or 1 ≤ k ≤ kmax
Boundary Constraint (C10)
Finally, we set kmax = 20 and solve the LP using the PuLP package in Python.
5 This gives a
set of parameters with Γ > 0.5016. In other words, we have found a set of parameters which ensure
approximate dual feasibility w.r.t. the desired competitive ratio. Recall that we always have αa ≥ 0
and βi ≥ 0 and reverse weak duality. This completes the proof of Theorem 1.
A Small Bids
This section presents the analysis of the algorithm by Mehta et al. [35] for small bids, i.e., bai ≤ 12Ba
for any advertiser a ∈ A and any impression i ∈ I. In this case, we consider a deterministic
algorithm that can achieve a 59 competitive ratio, which is part of results by Mehta et al. [35]. We
restate and analyze it using online primal dual framework and the configuration LP as demonstrated
in Section 2. This may serve as a warmup for readers who are not familiar with the framework.
Further, this is combined with the approach dealing with the large bids case in Section 4.2 to obtain
a hybrid algorithm in Section 6, and to get the competitive ratio as stated in Theorem 1.
5Our code is at available at http://www.zyhwtc.com:8080/file/hybrid.py
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Algorithm 6 A Deterministic Online Primal Dual Algorithm by Mehta et al. [35] (Parameterized
by a function α : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1])
state variables: Sa, the subset of impressions that are assigned to a already
for all impression i do
for all advertiser a ∈ A do
compute βi according to Eqn. (62)
end for
find a∗ that maximize βi, and assign i to a∗
end for
A.1 Online Primal Dual Algorithm
Algorithm 6 is driven by maximizing the dual variable βi for each impression i. For each advertiser
a, maintain the following invariant based on the subset of impressions that are already assigned to
a, denoted as Sa:
αa
def
= Ba · α
(
ba(Sa)
Ba
)
, (60)
where α : [0, 1] 7→ [0, 1] is a function to be optimized in the analysis. The online primal dual
algorithm and analysis shall impose several conditions on α, which we shall explain shortly in the
next subsection.
The computation of βi is based on the online primal dual framework in Lemma 2. First, let the
primal objective equal the dual objective, i.e., P = D. In fact, we make the increments of primal
and dual objectives equal in each round of assignments. That is, if an impression i is assigned to
an advertiser a, the assigned subset of impressions to advertiser a changes from Sa to Sa ∪ {i}:
∆D = ∆P = ba(Sa ∪ {i})− ba(Sa) .
Second, we divide the increment of the dual objective into two parts, the increment of αa and the
value of βi. By Eqn. (60), the former equals:
∆αa = Ba
(
α
(
ba(Sa ∪ {i})
Ba
)
− α
(
ba(Sa)
Ba
))
.
For convenience of notations, for any y ∈ [0, 1], define:
β(y)
def
= y − α(y) . (61)
Thus, define:
βi
def
= ∆D −∆αa = Ba
(
β
(
ba(Sa ∪ {i})
Ba
)
− β
(
ba(Sa)
Ba
))
. (62)
Algorithm 6 assigns each impression i a neighboring advertiser to maximize the value of βi.
A.2 Online Primal Dual Analysis
This subsection presents the online primal dual analysis using the framework in Lemma 2, and
proves the following theorem.
Theorem 41. Algorithm 6 is 59 -competitive for AdWords under small bids assumption.
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Recall that the primal and dual assignments ensure that the increments of primal and dual
objectives are equal in every step by definition. Next, we derive a set of conditions on the function
α which imply the approximate dual feasibility. Finally, we optimize α by solving a set of inequalities
derived by the feasibility analysis. Recall the approximate dual feasibility in Lemma 2. For any
advertiser a and any subset of impressions S ⊆ I, we need:
αa +
∑
i∈S
βi ≥ Γ · ba(S) . (63)
Conditions on α. We first give some conditions for α, which simplify the subsequent analysis.
1. Initial values. The above primal and dual assignments ensure equal increments in the primal
and dual objectives in every step. In order to get equal primal and dual objectives, we further
need them to have value 0 initially. It follows from its definition that the primal objective
equals 0 at the beginning. Thus we need:
α(0) = 0, β(0) = 0 . (64)
2. Convexity of α and Concavity of β. We shall choose α such that the portion of the
primal increment that is assigned to αa, i.e., the ratio of the increment of αa to the primal
increment, is nondecreasing in the value of αa. This further implies the concavity of β by
definition. We need:
∀y ∈ [0, 1] α′′(y) ≥ 0, β′′(y) ≤ 0 . (65)
This condition is driven by the online primal dual analysis of approximate dual feasibility,
i.e., Eqn. (63). In particular, the crux case is when none of i ∈ S is assigned to a and thus,
the value of βi is lower bounded by what advertiser a offers in Eqn. (62). When α is smaller,
we need to offer a larger portion of the gain to β in order to guarantee approximate dual
feasibility; and vice versa.
3. Curvature of α. We restrict the curvature of α with upper and lower bounds on its deriva-
tive, which implies bounds on the derivative of β by definition:
∀y ∈ [0, 1] 1− Γ ≤ α′(y) ≤ 1, 0 ≤ β′(y) ≤ Γ . (66)
The upper bound on α′ and the lower bound on β′ ensures that the assignment of βi’s in
Eqn. (62) satisfies nonnegativity. The lower bound on α′ and the upper bound on β′ is driven
by the observation that offering a Γ portion of the gain of an edge (a, i) to βi is sufficient for
covering the contribution of the edge to the RHS of Eqn. (63).
Contribution from βi. We next show the approximate dual feasibility, i.e., Eqn. (63), by char-
acterizing the contribution from i ∈ S for any S ⊆ I. Let Sa be the set of impressions assigned to
advertiser a.
Lemma 42. For any impression i ∈ S,
βi ≥ Ba
(
β
(
ba(Sa ∪ {i})
Ba
)
− β
(
ba(Sa)
Ba
))
.
Proof. Any impression i ∈ S could have gotten a share equal to the above, except that Sa might
be a smaller subset at the time when i arrives; the RHS above is therefore a valid lower bound by
the concavity of β and the definition of the algorithm.
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Proof of Theorem 41. Combining Lemma 42 with the definition of αa, it remains to prove that:
Baα
(
ba(Sa)
Ba
)
+
∑
i∈S
Ba
(
β
(
ba(Sa ∪ {i})
Ba
)
− β
(
ba(Sa)
Ba
))
≥ Γ · ba(S) .
Next, we simplify the above inequality using the sufficient conditions in Equations (65) and
(66). First, dividing both sides by Ba, it becomes clear that only the ratios of the bids bai’s to
the budget Ba matter. Hence, we may wlog normalize Ba = 1 to simplify notations. The above
inequality turns to:
α
(
ba(Sa)
)
+
∑
i∈S
(
β
(
ba(Sa ∪ {i})
)− β(ba(Sa))) ≥ Γ · ba(S) ,
where the definition of ba(·) becomes:
∀S ⊆ I : ba(S) def= min
{
1,
∑
i∈S
bai
}
.
Second, we claim that it suffices to consider the case when
∑
i∈S bai = Ba = 1. If
∑
i∈S bai
is strictly larger than Ba, we may decrease some bai: the LHS weakly decreases while the RHS
remains the same. If
∑
i∈S bai is strictly smaller than Ba, on the other hand, we may increase some
bai so that the LHS increases at rate at most Γ (by the definition of ba and Eqn. (65)), the the RHS
increases at rate exactly Γ.
Finally, recall that the small bids assumption ensures any bai ≤ 12Ba. Thus by the concavity of
β (Eqn. (66)) and ba(·), it suffices to consider |S| = 2 with bai = 12 for both i ∈ S.
Therefore, for any b = ba(Sa), we need:
α(b) + 2 · (β(min{b+ 12 , 1})− β(b)) ≥ Γ .
Combining with the definition of β in Eqn. (61), and writing the cases of 0 ≤ β ≤ 12 and
1
2 < β ≤ 1 separately, we get that:
0 ≤ b ≤ 12 : 3α(b)− 2α(b+ 12) + 1 ≥ Γ ;
1
2 < b ≤ 1 : 3α(b)− 2α(1) + 2(1− b) ≥ Γ .
Solving it with the boundary condition α(0) = 0 (Eqn. (64)) gives Γ = 59 with:
α(y) =
{
4
9y 0 ≤ y ≤ 12 ;
2
3y − 19 12 < y ≤ 1 .
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